THEOLOGY

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Edited by the Rev. Alec R. Vidler, B.D., St. Deiniol's Library, Hawarden, to whom MSS. should be sent. Reviews and all business communications should be addressed to S.P.C.K., Northumberland Avenue, London, W.C. 2.

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EDITORIAL

Readers of Mr. Aldous Huxley's *Ends and Means* have probably been impressed by his righteous indignation with the "righteous indignation" which is always passionately denounced by the passionless philosophers. He says that it comes from the Old Testament, upon the "Bronze Age mentality" of which he is very severe. There is of course no doubt that it is very dangerous to be indignant at all. To be indignant in your own cause is almost always wrong, and self-interest has a nasty way of being wrapped up even with what purports to be an altruistic outburst. It is so hard to be pro-A without being anti-B, and the secret motive of anti-B-ness is often either fear or greed, both self-centred things. Yet Christian readers may well have felt that Mr. Huxley was not getting quite all the packing out of the case. One at least had a recollection of what was once said about Dean Church. In himself peculiarly and sometimes aggravatingly self-effacing, he could be roused. About the Bulgarian massacres he flared out. Scott Holland says:

> We are used to such passion over personal wrongs; there it gives us no surprise. But a flame of righteous anger that has no trace of personal injury in it, and that leaps up at the sight of public wrong because it is wrong, and for no other reason—this is rare indeed. And it was all the more startling, as it sprang from one so associated with courteous gentleness as the Dean. Yet there it was. No one could mistake it. It was the pure, white anger of an outraged conscience. When once you had caught sight of it you never forgot it. It was recognized as the typical expression of his personality. I have known people who have said that it was the only human experience which gave them a clue to what was meant by the paradox of St. John, "the wrath of the Lamb." Certainly I can imagine no one whose rebuke would be more terrible to undergo.

It was the recollection of this or some other like illustration of "the wrath of the Lamb" that qualified our acceptance of Mr. Huxley's Buddhist passivity.

And then comes Dr. Edwyn Bevan with his Gifford Lectures on *Symbolism and Belief* (George Allen and Unwin, 15s.) to explain it to us. His ninth and tenth chapters are a discriminating enquiry into what is meant by the symbol of the wrath of God, and the even larger subject of the "inequality in the good enjoyed by different conscious creatures of God." In rejecting an academic theory of Origen, he provides an example of the best kind of realism, and incidentally commends Bible religion in a way that needed to be done. The second half of his book seemed to us the more interesting of the two. In the earlier lectures he deals with various categories, Height, Time, Light, Spirit, and brings to bear a great deal of recondite scholarship and delicate reasoning. Here is an example of the skill with which, without transgressing the limits imposed by Lord Gifford's foundation, he pricks one of the bubbles of the *religionsgeschichtliche* school:

> It is admitted that with primitive man such words as *pneuma*, *spiritus*, meant literally material breath or air in motion: we use them today to denote something non-material: therefore that the change in meaning did occur at some time or other is certain. But why should we suppose that it occurred after St. Paul, and not before? Why should not St. Paul have found *pneuma* already understood by Greek-speaking Jews in what we call a spiritual sense? Why should phrases which spoke of the Spirit being poured out have been understood by the first generations of Christians otherwise than as figures of speech, otherwise than we understand such phrases today? If you want to put the moment when the meaning changed after St. Paul, between St. Paul and ourselves, you will, I think, find considerable difficulty in making out a likely date for it.

That is the way in which the Gifford Lectures should make their points.

The remaining chapters of the book deal with a rich variety of theological problems: the Literal and the Symbolical, Pragmatism, Analogy (the thing greatly preferred to Symbolism in official Roman Catholic theology), the Manselian "Christian Agnosticism," which receives some defence, Rationalism and Mysticism. He does not feel at liberty to pronounce on such matters as the Modernist claim to interpret the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection "symbolically," but he takes the claim to pieces in an illuminating way. Impersonally, but effectively, he notes that if our Lord is—

> a Person still active, not only through the memory of his past life, but in the reality of his present life, in intercourse with the souls of men . . . then plainly the Christian Church could not allow that all Christian dogma is merely symbolical without self-destruction.

As with Professor Taylor's *Faith of a Moralist*, the accomplished reader will value the whole book, but the less accomplished non-specialist will feel that the second half of it deals with things that are nearer to his experience.

Some smaller books, lately met, are deserving of mention. The Dean of Durham's *The New Testament: A Reader's Guide* (Bell, 5s.) is full of information, ingeniously grouped and presented. It actually contains a certain amount of commentary on every chapter of the New Testament, and the whole book is a remarkable essay in wise compression. Miss B. K. Rattey's *Saint Matthew* in the School Clarendon Bible contains Introduction, Text, Commentary, Illustrations and a Map. Those who prepare candidates for the School Certificate Examination could not want a better book. *Asking them Questions* (Oxford University Press, 3s. 6d.) contains some very valuable answers by competent theologians to forty questions asked by members of a Boys' Bible Class. It is edited by R. Selby Wright.

This is the last editorial that the present editor will write. His pen is laid down with a multitude of happy recollections, with regrets, with eager hope for the future. The happy recollections are in the first place of contributors, some very learned, some not quite so learned, but always friendly and considerate. They have had no motive except a very natural hope that their own reflections and the labour they have spent in writing may be of service to the Church. The articles submitted have been far more in number than it has been possible to use, and their writers have often been very patient in waiting a long time for publication. And if they have occasionally over-estimated the merits of their own productions, that is a very common error, which most of us commit at times. In the second place there is a very happy recollection of the never-failing and always superbly efficient co-operation of the Editorial Secretary of S.P.C.K., who is probably the most useful servant that the Church of England possesses in this generation. As director of the review department, and as an unobtrusive, wise adviser, he has never failed the editor. In the third place there is a grateful consciousness of a debt due to readers. A numerous body, more numerous, it is thought, than the number of copies purchased would by itself suggest, they have for the most part remained silent. Occasionally they have written to remonstrate for some real or fancied

indiscretion, or to express approval. But their silence has seemed to be the kind of silence whence an *argumentum* can be drawn. It is "significant," of interest. Finally, the staff of Messrs. Billing and Sons have been skilful and intelligent. Their "queries" are always sensible, and sometimes erudite.

The regrets are natural enough. To have edited this Journal for years is to have listened in to a great deal of what has been going forward in the minds of Churchpeople during that time. This is a large privilege. And very instructive. A lot of stuff is talked about leadership, as if persons put into representative positions knew out of their own heads the mind of the community. It is nonsense. They have of course their own conscience and their own intelligence. Some things seem to them to be true and some things seem to them to be prudent. But, given a certain degree of harmony between them and their constituents, they learn their wisdom from the public. An editor, like anybody else in any sort of judicial position, has to interpret sounds that are heard both in the tops of the trees and in the rustling grass below. Public speakers take what their audience is dimly feeling, and give to it form and coherence. It came in the beginning from the audience, but it is a privilege to find words for it. An editor is like that, and he has the further advantage of being furnished with articulate sounds. He has access to carefully written opinions. He has his network of spies all over the country. He has not hired them, and he does not even know their names until they send their articles. But they are his spies all the same.

There is a further ground for regret on which it would be tiresome to enlarge. Over and above failings of a personal kind, an ecclesiastic who has a great many duties cannot give to the work of such a Journal as this the assiduous attention that it deserves. Of some of the blemishes that have been due to these deficiencies the readers are probably conscious. There are others which have perhaps not become apparent, but are none the less to be regretted. One thing not regretted is the playful tone that from time to time has crept—if that be the word—into the editorial language. It is an antique fashion, almost extinct since the old-time London cabman and 'bus driver have been replaced by the strong, silent genius of the machine, but there is still something to be said for it. It enables controversy to be carried on with the minimum of rudeness.

The hopes are very genuine, founded upon long friendship with Alec Vidler. Lucretius speaks of those who

quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt.

It is the way of the world, the way of life. And it is much to be welcomed. Where the lamp is the lamp of truth, it is not merely passed, like the baton of a relay race, from hand to hand. It increases, and shines more brightly, as fresh hands hold it aloft and carry it over new ground. It is time that a younger man should have the task. What does Elihu the son of Barachel the Buzite say ?

> I am young and ye are very old;
> Wherefore I held back, and durst not shew you my opinion.
> I said, Days should speak,
> And multitude of years should teach wisdom.
> But there is a spirit in man,
> And the breath of the Almighty giveth them understanding.
> It is not the great that are wise,
> Nor the aged that understand judgment.
> Therefore I said, Hearken to me:
> I also will shew mine opinion.

It is of course quite certain that the new editor would never say all that, because he is the most modest of men. But a thing which can only be said here in December, 1938, and could not be said in January, 1939, may be true for all that. Only a week or two ago the editor was reminded, by a correspondent, in the kindest and most considerate way possible, that people of his generation have no idea of the difference between their thought and that of today. " We are no longer thinking in terms of the old pre-war 'Liberal' assumptions and anthropocentricisms at all. *X* (a recent publication) has a terrible smell of pre-war Senior Common Rooms. Nine-tenths of the questions that *I* want to ask and the difficulties *I* feel never come above the horizon in it. And I know that the majority of thoughtful people of my age, clergy and laity, faithful and unfaithful alike, with whom I have talked about it, feel the same dreadful irrelevance and staleness in it." Well, there it is. Neither this Journal nor the editor is in any sense responsible for *X*, but if the new generation feel like that, then the Lord be with them, and let them speak. It is no good for us to argue the point except in ways that would take a long time. There is no short way of meeting the objection, " You do not understand."

In the new editor you have a man who at Cambridge and elsewhere has been in close touch with the rising generation and, moreover, has contacts with some of those brilliant Church

laymen who are among its recognized and acknowledged leaders. He has spent several years at Cambridge at the Oratory of the Good Shepherd, and only a year ago he was one of the conductors of a Mission to the University of Oxford. Thus he has added to his theological learning the kind of pastoral experience that is peculiarly necessary for this work. That he will be faithful to a truly Catholic understanding of the Christian revelation is certain.

That a few treasured conventions will now and then receive, as they have received before, something of a shock, is likely enough. If that should happen, say to yourself, in the old words of—is it Samuel Smiles ?—" Was it wise ? Was it kind ? Was it necessary ?" And the answer, on all three counts, will probably be " Yes." There are some ideas, ideas of good family and an honourable record, which need to be shaken before they can become useful. And there are some people—no doubt very few among our readers—who need themselves to be shaken. Remember, in *Manalive*, the irresistible tendency of Dr. Warner to be shot at. Our readers are happily quite unlike Dr. Warner in most respects, but we must all learn to say to ourselves, on receiving any kind of jolt: " But perhaps it was very good for me."

These last sentences are in reality more of an *apologia* for the past than an attempt to forestall criticism of any feared iconoclasm in the future. We have no kind of doubt that THEOLOGY will continue to be what it has always been, an organ of intelligent orthodoxy, aware of what modern men are saying, but faithful to what God has said, is saying, and will say. The modern gospels are either hopelessly confused or ludicrously partial. Christian theology alone is both consistent and spacious. With Christian theology, if it can avoid obscurantism on the one hand and licence on the other hand, the future lies.

SCIENCE AND THE MYSTERIES

ARMITAGE ROBINSON'S article on the Mysteries, in his Commentary on the Ephesians, well deserves the respect in which it is held. Not only is it a masterly piece of work, but it affords a relief to our minds. If St. Paul, in the passages in which he uses the word "mystery," is referring to the religions called by that name, then the reference is quite useless to us, because we cannot possibly follow it up. The Mystery Religions kept their secrets to themselves, and time has only buried them deeper. But Armitage Robinson shews that, at least in the main, "the word 'secret' seems fully to represent the meaning" of the word as used by St. Paul. So we are delivered from any need to grope under the dust of ages for a religion which was subterraneous even in its own day.

However, we cannot leave the question at that. We must discuss it further, for two reasons—one which belongs to our own peculiar conditions, and one which seems to be of enduring importance. Has the term "mystery" acquired a context which must be cut away? Does the word attach itself to anything of enduring importance in life?

First, then, we have to ask whether we can retain the word "mystery" at all, even when we have defined it as meaning a secret. It is in such common use at present that, willy-nilly, we regard a mystery as something which can be dismissed from our minds as soon as it is discovered. We are only interested in a mystery until it is cleared up; once it is cleared up it has no further importance—the affair is over. When the Hound of the Baskervilles is detected, it is shot, and nothing more is needed but a rest cure for its intended victim.

It is true that life is easier, and that it is possible to carry it on much more profitably, when such puzzling mysteries are cleared up. But we, perhaps more than earlier generations, associate the word "mystery" with the nefarious purposes of criminals, who conceal their plans because they will not bear the light. With this and cognate prepossessions in our minds, we feel uneasy with the word "secrecy," even when it is used of God's ways. Why, we find ourselves asking, should God, Who loves the light, wrap, or have wrapped, His plans in concealment? We thus pass from a difficulty about words to a difficulty about ideas. We may well be thankful, like St. Paul, that the mystery is revealed, that the secret is out so

that we can act on it. But why was it ever concealed? Why this difference between the past, when it was kept hid, and the present, when it is patent? Why should anything have ever been kept dark? If it was right to keep it in the dark then, why not now?

Let us take the word in its New Testament context. In the first paragraph (after the salutation) of the Ephesians, the mention of a mystery is preceded by the mention of a decision, preceding all creation, as to its ultimate result. The course of events was to produce certain persons who might understand what God was driving at. These persons were to occur at a definite crisis in the operation of God's will, when it would be possible for men to understand, and, therefore, co-operate intelligently in the execution of God's will. This implies two stages—first, one at which God promoted His Boule, His settled plan, working through people who did not understand, and, second, one at which He works with the co-operation of some who understood. Even before we go further, it may be pointed out that this is not an odd procedure, but part of the regular methods of human progress and mental evolution. It is a feature which is well exemplified, though little regarded. We are familiar with the observation that one of the results of advancing civilization is that men lose their primitive instincts, as, for example, the savage's instinct for tracking. People who make this remark forget that we have put a vast machinery in place of the savage's instinct. Few people seem to notice that progress often consists in exactly this passage from instinct, the uncomprehended drive, to reason, the intelligent action. And one may fairly ask whether the matter would have been reasoned out had man not first been acting without understanding, and then wondered why he did it; or, to put it another way, whether he would ever have been fitted for intelligent action, if the predisposition had not been there. This is a case in which the egg must precede the bird.

But, to return to the definition, or re-definition, of the Mystery, it is here what we nowadays should call a principle or law of evolution. Such a principle is not only hidden from the casual glance, but even from many of those who are deeply affected by it. It remains unknown until it comes to its issue. We human beings understand the principle of Evolution because we are at its last stage and can read it backwards.

The second reference in Ephesians (iii. 9), "to make all men see what is the dispensation (οἰκονομία) of the mystery which from all ages hath been hid in God who created all things." If we use, instead of "dispensation," our own idiom "system,"

then the phrase stands for "the system of underlying forces, constituted according to the ideas which God had in mind." This thought of a system, lying under the surface, but affecting the superficial phenomena, is only a clearer statement of an idea which runs through Scripture from the prophets onward. The goal of the Gospel is the Kingdom of Heaven. This is not a system conceived but not yet actualized. It is immanent and therefore imminent. It may not be, it is not, apparent on the surface. But it is "at hand," has come near, is so active that its results emerge. Similarly, the inclusion of the whole human race (for that is the point of the preaching to the Gentiles of ver. 8) is the working out of the purpose of the ages (R.V. marg., ver. 11). That is to say, this inclusion is not merely something which had been kept in the dark and has now been disclosed, it is the implicit object to which the successive ages have been directed. It is noteworthy how, as St. Paul saw, the purpose and arrangement were so deep-seated, that even the spiritual beings (ver. 10) who were carrying it out, are only grasping its character now that it is issuing in the overt product of human nature. Not until now had the action of God produced phenomena which disclosed the nature of God's hidden working (ver. 10), even to them.

Now, as has been frequently remarked, the New Testament, and indeed the whole Bible, is full of the idea of the distinction and connection between the world of causes and the world of results. Indeed, this is the distinction, involved all through the Biblical writings, between Heaven and Earth. To us, human beings, who are in the world of causes as well as the world of effects, this distinction and connection form a practical problem, on whose elucidation our whole efficiency depends. This is true not only of our spiritual life, but of our physical problems. The natural scientist may have begun as a mere cataloguer, who imagined that there was no mystery about Nature. But he has certainly found himself encountering mysteries—not merely in the sense of puzzles, but in the sense of hidden forces, forces which have produced the present condition of the universe, forces which have always been the key to the situation. We have obtained a great mastery of Nature, because we have solved the mystery. But notice that, in the case of physical forces, the mystery remains, despite the analysis and solution. For example, electricity is a puzzle to the uninitiated. But it also remains a mystery to the initiated. The scientist knows the manner of its behaviour; he knows how to lay hold of it and use it. But the thing itself remains hidden. Despite popular opinion, no man has seen or can see it. We know it by its effects, for it is the

underlying cause and source of all physical matter, and is everywhere present, but it is always hidden.

I may remark, in passing, that this analogy, or perhaps, rather, example, being taken from God's works and ways, eases a problem. As long as the word "mystery" is regarded as simply meaning a secret, without any context to give it further definition, one wonders, as I have said, at the conception of a God who keeps important facts hidden for a time and then lets them out. This adoption of a policy of secrecy, followed by a revelation, seems arbitrary and inconsistent. But here in nature we see the secret and the overt combining to form a whole, and remaining in combination after the existence and character of the secret are revealed. We may take, then, for the present, at least, "underlying force" as an elucidatory term. It may not be—it is not—equivalent to all that St. Paul labels with the name of Mystery. But it is at least current coin, while the other is a museum piece. And referring us, as it does, to known facts, it does what St. Paul meant his word to do—give us a systematic view of the facts.

If we go on from physical matter to life, the sense of hidden and mysterious power grows stronger. But there is a factor added, which carries our thoughts further. There is, indeed, a school of scientists who endeavour to explain the activities of life by mechanical or chemical means. Their work and their very attitude are necessary to prevent us from falling into error. But though they have suggested, and even proved, the existence of mechanism, where we did not expect it, we are less doubtful than ever that much which we observe is due to a hidden, underlying something, which we call life. This is not, like physical force, something sent on a way which it must follow, but it pursues definite objects, and alters its own course when it meets with obstacles. But though the results are plain, and betray, to the critical mind, much of the character of that which lies behind, the thing itself, life, is wrapped in obscurity. So in a higher work of God than inorganic matter we see the same combination of secrecy and revelation, with an added feature which resembles the full spiritual processes indicated by St. Paul—namely, that the full revelation of life, and, indeed, the stages of its revelation, come at "the fullness of the times," *i.e.*, at the appropriate period when the necessary preliminaries have been completed.

A brief consideration of the evolution of life will elucidate this. Evolution is a theory (that is to say, a way of looking at things), which has become accepted because it brings out an intelligible connection and order in a very large number of facts which seemed unrelated and chaotic. It sees all life as

partaking in a process which has been going on from the very start, which has, on the whole, moved in a particular direction, moving on to its final product, man. There has been a latent tendency at work, which has pursued its track all through that long history, revealing its nature more and more fully as it went on. It is pertinent to our purpose to notice that this hidden tendency has achieved its end, not by advancing all life equally, but by producing specific groups, from which other specific groups were advanced and isolated, till a final group, far in advance of all the rest, is arrived at. Man is the Israel of the animal kingdom. Israel, and, later, the Church which arose out of it, were produced on the same principle which gave man his special and specific place among living beings. The end, strangely different from the superficial appearance of the beginnings, is the expression of an historic principle, which finally emerged in clearness in the Church.

But a closer coincidence becomes evident on the further consideration of evolution in Nature. That process has, as St. Paul himself observed,* the appearance of being at a standstill, as though it awaited something or someone who would enable it to resume its progress. As far as we can discern the present situation in Nature, it would appear that the work of evolution was carried on by a sort of inward urge, or, as we say, by instinct, until the production of the creature who could bring to it understanding and intelligent purpose. But even since his arrival, it has had to wait for his seeing the secret and acting in its light. Unconsciously and fumblingly, man had promoted the evolution of certain plants and animals already, but it is only since the secret of evolution has been revealed to him that he has realized his position as a potential creator—the deputy of the Creator Who has handed over the continuation of His work to man. As with Christianity in its early days, the revealed secret needs exploration. But even its disclosure, to eyes as yet unused to it, has given to man a sense of power and responsibility—power, because he can ally his actions with a fundamental principle of life, and responsibility because all future progress depends upon his discretion. So this present juncture in the history of man as related to the earth, when, at the very point where, apparently, a conscious director is needed, it is found that all manner of age-long movements have converged to produce him at last—this juncture, I say, shews a character precisely similar to that juncture when the Son of Man was born " in the fulness of time."

Those who wish to study Nature in itself, apart from its

* Romans viii. 22: " The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now." See verses 19 to 23.

relation to its Creator—and scientific students must thus restrict their field, if they are to find it manageable—are greatly at variance as to whether Evolution is a plan imbedded and immanent in Nature from the very beginning. But most would agree that the history looks as though it were meant to lead up to man. And all, I think, would agree that Evolution is only to be understood in the light of its final product. It is only as we look back from man that we can understand it. In him, the secret comes out. But, in its working, the secrecy remains, for it is a fundamental principle of life, and like all foundations, it underlies and is concealed by that which appears. That is why it is the key to the future.

The application of all this, in a general way, to the combination of secrecy and revelation, for which St. Paul uses the term Mystery, is fairly obvious. But before saying anything about particular passages, a word ought to be added. Scientists are agreed that the underlying principle, called Evolution, is intelligible. Most of them, therefore, agree that this implies an underlying Mind. Some of them, it is true, use the word Mind in a very vague way. But for us Christians the word takes on a decided meaning, since to us it is the Mind of God. Furthermore, where they would describe Evolution as an idea, without trying to say in whose mind it exists, we must include it in Christ Who is the Idea (Logos) of God. To any Christian, then, such underlying plans, slowly germinating beneath the surface, are the self-exposition of the mind of God in Christ.

Now to speak to particular passages. It will be felt that these idioms of our own days, " an underlying and tendencious power " and " fundamental principle," make them speak more clearly to our minds. For example, the one passage in the Synoptic Gospels in which the word Mysteria occurs, that in which our Lord justifies His use of parables for the uninitiated (Mark iv. 11 and parallels), means " to you it is given to know the underlying principles of the Kingdom."

Of the phrase in the Apocalypse " The Mystery of the Seven Stars " which follows, significantly, after the words " I will shew you what is to come about after this," Armitage Robinson himself remarks that the word is used " in a somewhat special sense, as either the *meaning underlying** an external symbol, or even the symbol itself." He also remarks on the Man of Iniquity (2 Thess. ii. 7). " Here there can be little doubt that the word Mysterion has been suggested as the natural counterpart to the Apocalypsis already spoken of. The Man of Iniquity is the embodiment of the *principle** of iniquity in

* Italics mine.—R. O. P. T.

a personality. The restraint which at present hinders him from being 'revealed' is first spoken of as a principle of restraint (τὸ κατέχον) and then as a personal embodiment of that *principle* (ὁ κατέχων)." And in speaking of 1 Cor. ii. "proclaiming the mystery of God," he says, "This use of the word is the characteristically Pauline use. It denotes the secret purpose of God in His dealings with man. This is *par excellence* the Mystery." I have quoted these to shew that Armitage Robinson had come to the threshold of the ideas developed above. But I venture to think that the second passage (1 Cor. ii. 1) becomes more lucid, and indeed has more justice done to it, if we paraphrase by "We state the thought (Wisdom) of God in its principle, the thought which was hidden,* which God had laid down prior to the ages, to shine out in us, and give us His distinction." In 1 Cor. iv. 1 the meaning would be "ministers of Christ, and distributors of the hidden spiritual forces of God." In 1 Cor. xiii. 2 "know the underlying forces," or principles, would lead naturally to the mention of "knowledge" and on to the faith which removes mountains. In 1 Cor. xiv. 2 "in the spirit he speaketh mysteries" would be more explicit, not to say accurate, if we interpret, "is moved by the underlying forces of religion, but cannot bring them to an intelligible expression." Also in the same Epistle xv. 51 of the change at the Second Coming, "behold I tell you a mystery" is said because St. Paul is shewing how the principle involved in the Earthly and Heavenly Man, will work out at its coming to the surface in the New World. In Rom. xi. 25, to use Armitage Robinson's words, "the problem of the unbelief of Israel, which in some strange way is bound up with mercy to the Gentiles, is spoken of as a divine secret"—but surely not merely in the sense of something held back; it is the underlying principle which explains, and was a cause of (or availed itself of), the strange course of Jewish history. Going on to Col. i. 26, 27, and, indeed, going to the heart of the matter, he comments on "this mystery among the Gentiles, which is Christ in you the hope of glory," by saying "Christ in you Gentiles—that is the great surprise. None could have foreseen or imagined it. It was God's secret, He has disclosed it to us." This is correct, as far as it goes, but it does not put the secret, as it were, in its place. It has been secret, because it was working under the surface, not simply because it was an *arrière pensée* of God, an idea which He had in mind but did not put into force till the "last days."

In Col. ii. 2, as he remarks "the mystery of God is Christ"

† The insertion of the indefinite article in "the wisdom of God in a mystery" is unnecessary and misleading.

though the fuller meaning—or rather deeper characteristic—which I am suggesting gives it clarity, and permanent importance. Christ is the power of God underlying human history, and is also its decisive phenomenon. In Col. iv. 3 " to speak the mystery of Christ " would be " to declare the nature of Christ's hidden working."

The passages in Ephesians serve to indicate the necessity for seeing the facts in a larger context than is indicated by " secret," or by the Mystery religions. If I may paraphrase them they amount to this. Eph. i. 9, 10: " The Father has made known to us the principle on which He had decided to work. This principle, he had arranged, was to produce its effect in Christ when the due combination of circumstances had been evolved. This idea, which He had framed, was to bring all things to their perfection in Christ." iii. 3-6: " The fundamental principle of His policy has been disclosed to me, and I have already stated it in brief. If you ponder what I have written above, you will be able to follow up my analysis of the intention which underlay the sending of the Christ. This intention was not made known to the human race in other days in anything like the way in which it has now made itself felt in the minds of the messengers and spokesmen who are moved by God. It has been made clear to them that God's ulterior purpose was to make all kinds of people co-partners, organic members and shareholders in all the benefits promised in Christ Jesus." iii. 9: " the social structure arising out of the principle made implicit in Creation by the God Who made the whole Universe." And in vi. 19, in order to express another aspect of the matter, for " to make known the mystery of the Gospel," it might be well to explain it as " to make clear how the problems of life are solved by the Gospel."

A point at which Armitage Robinson seems to check thought very abruptly is his treatment of ver. 32, in which, speaking of marriage, we read " This is a great mystery." He says: " St. Paul has cited the ordinance of marriage, which closes with the enigmatic words ' and the twain shall become one flesh.' This saying is true, he seems to say, of earthly marriage, but it has a higher signification. The ancient ordinance is not merely a divinely constituted law of human life: it has a secret meaning. It is a Mysterion, and the Mysterion is a mighty one. I declare it in reference to Christ and to the Church. I say no more of it now, but I bid you to see to it that in common life each of you is true to its first and plainest meaning, for the sake of the deeper meaning which lies hid in Christ." But surely the words " the Mysterion is a mighty one " betray a feeling that there is not merely a secret, but

a secret—*i.e.*, underlying—power, an effect, or at least a dealing with causes which do not lie on the surface.

The two passages in the Pastorals remain to be considered. In 1 Tim. iii. 19 we read that a deacon is to hold "the mystery of the faith in a pure conscience." On this Armitage Robinson says: "No secret lore can be meant: he is not the depository of a secret tradition." So the insistence on the limitation of Mysterion to Secret breaks down, and all that he can say is: "The phrase in its context can only refer to such elementary and fundamental knowledge as any servant of the Church must necessarily have." But if Mysterion implies "the fundamental principles, the invisible action of grace," then the word need not be emptied of meaning. The same consideration applies to 1 Tim. iii. 16, "Great is the mystery of godliness." This leads into, "He who was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit, preached among the nations, believed on in the world, received up into glory." Christ is the Mystery, the fundamental spiritual force, who thus achieved His purpose, and revealed Himself. The word thus comes into line with St. Paul's teaching, whereas Armitage Robinson, having reduced *μυστήριον*, at this point, to "the sum of the Christian faith," feels that the passage is probably alien to St. Paul, so that he doubts whether the passage can be his.

So much attention has been given, latterly, to the problem of St. Paul's relation to the Mystery religions, that, whether this relation is believed in, or disbelieved, it seems the only relevant consideration. Consequently, it may be felt that I have been forcing the interpretation of St. Paul into a wrong channel. But I venture to assert that it was the channel in which St. Paul's mind would naturally run, and into which, indeed, he would desire to run the minds of others. This might well be confirmed by a reference to St. Paul's system of thought in general. But, besides this, a special reason may be urged. What amount of importance he attached to the Mystery religions, or even to their terminology, is doubtful. But there can be no doubt that he would, and did, attach importance to the book called the Wisdom of Solomon. Now this book is a study of that Wisdom which is called Sophia, and Sophia is the highest form of wisdom, "embracing the knowledge of first principles" (I.C.C. on Col. i. 9). In the early and fundamental part of this book, the word "mystery" is used, not frequently indeed, but significantly. Remembering that the author is dealing with the fundamental principles of life, it is interesting to notice that he denounces the wicked as "not knowing the mysteries of God." As a reference to the Mystery religions (even if the author knew or cared about them), this

would be both oblique and strange, but as a reference to the fundamental ideas with which Sophia deals it is clear enough. Furthermore, the author deliberately knits up the wisdom, which he is expounding, with Mysteries. In vi. 22 he says: "What wisdom is and how she came into being, I will declare. And I will not hide mysteries (*μυστήρια*) from you. But I will trace her out from the beginning of Creation, and bring the knowledge of her into clear light." (Knowledge, by the way, is here *γνῶσιν* in the LXX and *scientiam* in the Vulgate.) And in viii. 4 he goes further. "Wisdom," he says, is initiated into the knowledge of God. He actually uses the term *mystis*, *μύστις*, the technical mystery term, *μύστις γάρ ἐστι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιστήμης*.

Moral and spiritual subjects are the main preoccupations of the author's mind. But he does not limit his study of Wisdom to these. As might almost be expected from his giving to his book the name of Solomon, who was, in his day and place, an eminent student of natural science, he includes the study of Nature within his subject.* In vii. 15-20, in fact, he makes it extend over the whole area of Natural Science. A salient set of phrases is (v. 17) "to know the constitution of the world and the operation of the elements . . . the alternation of solstices," and so on through zoology and botany. He ends this by saying: "All things that are either secret or manifest I learned, for she that is the artificer of all things taught me, even wisdom." Here the word used for secrets is *κρυπτά*, which, as one would expect, was in use in the Mystery religions. But there can be no doubt that the author of Wisdom was not referring to them. His tradition would forbid that. It stands, and must stand, here for the underlying forces of nature.

Considering the status of this book, and the line which its author takes in a treatise of a lofty theological character, I venture to believe that the use of an approach to St. Paul's statements from a consideration of the hidden forces and underlying plan of nature is more than justified. Certainly, for us, the mysterious powers of Nature, and its innate possibilities, so slow in coming to the surface, but yet only buried to be revealed at last, are a better starting-point for thought, and are certainly better calculated to be indices to the nature of the spiritual world, than the problematic doctrines of Christianity's long-vanished rivals. After all, the ways of Nature are the ways of God, and His methods there are an exposition of His ways in the still deeper areas of the Spirit.

R. O. P. Taylor.

* It is worth mentioning here that Liddell and Scott (in the old edition) say that in later Greek μυστήρια meant all matters of science which required teaching.

BARON VON HÜGEL

"TAKE any group of modern people who are interested in the philosophy of religion, in the idea of Catholicism, in mysticism, in the relation of the natural and the supernatural, and listen to their conversation. They will refer every now and then with great respect and with an occasional smile to 'the Baron.' Who is this Baron? It is Friedrich von Hügel, an Austrian born in Florence, who spent the whole of his long life in England, and died in 1927. The smile will come of their recollections of his ponderous Germanic sentences, lightened from time to time by incursions from the vivacious vocabulary of an English schoolboy. The respect will be that due to the man who has been described as 'a saint among philosophers.'

"He contrived to be at the same time intensely Catholic and intensely Liberal. It was something of a paradox to others. His Liberal friends would sometimes be startled when at the end of a philosophical discussion, in which he had seemed more familiar with the arguments against faith and more aware of their intellectual and spiritual force than anyone, he would say, 'Excuse me, but I must leave you.' They would darkly conjecture that he had gone to light a candle in honour of Saint Catherine. His letters to Tyrrell shew how daring he was. Meantime his orthodox friends sometimes wondered what on earth he would say next."

An Austrian (with a Scottish mother, who had been a Presbyterian, was now a Catholic), born in Florence, learning his catechism from an Anglican, for the rest educated at Rome by the most diverse masters, one of them a Jew, it was inevitable that the Baron, when finally he settled down in England, should be cosmopolitan in more senses than one. Whether for good or for evil he had not learnt discipline of mind from his childhood, except so far as it is necessary for all learning; instead, he developed that insatiable craving to probe beneath the surface, to estimate things and men, not so much by what they seemed to be and said, but by what they stood for, which often gave his friends the impression of contradictoriness. Thus he read Father Tyrrell, but found him a man to love and teach, rather than to know; he differed fundamentally, more than he knew himself, from Loisy, yet saw in him the personification of *in dubiis libertas*; he acknowledged the agnosticism of Lyell, yet held him up as a model seeker after truth. It is well to remember this background in any attempt to analyse either the method of von Hügel or his conclusions.

Von Hügel has always been somewhat of an enigma. The

mixed influence of his early years, his zest for probing, his daring views, his intimacy with Tyrrell—all these, combined with the influence of Loisy, might easily have spelled disaster. The Baron's position in the Modernist crisis was certainly open to suspicion, but in Abbé Nédoncelle's opinion he was neither "liaison officer" nor "lay bishop," as described by Paul Sabatier.

Undoubtedly erring at times on the side of limited resistance to official orders, the part he played was rather that of a respected adviser striving to hold off censures from his friends.

"A great scholar and a great saint, a profound lover of God and man. A fervent Roman Catholic, but a no less fervent lover of truth, a man keen, eager and fearless; a man intellectually the peer of the very ablest in the land, yet no less ready to take endless pains for little people of moderate brains, and withal so humble, so alive to goodness in lowly places."

Since Cardinal Newman, no Catholic theologian in England has exercised so wide an influence beyond the frontiers of his own Communion as the late Baron von Hügel. It is unlikely that his writings will be of the same interest to future generations as Newman's. His career was comparatively deficient in dramatic event; his actions were of less public consequence; his personality lacked the subtle spell of mystery; his contributions to theological thought were less clear and tangible than Newman's theory of development or the "Grammar of Assent"; and, last but not least, his literary style was curious and cumbersome, whereas Newman's was so exquisitely distinguished that he is, and will continue to be, read for the sake of his English alone.

Nevertheless, von Hügel has a richer and more profound message for the present age than Newman. The religious and philosophical problems, which his great and finely balanced mind investigated, are the problems with which all serious Christian thinkers will have to wrestle for some time to come. It was the Baron's virtue that he faced every problem in its full difficulty, and eschewed all easy and superficial solutions. Nor shall we find in his writings a finished theological or philosophical system; indeed, he waged unremitting warfare against the kind of logical systematization which is dear to intellects that have been cast in a scholastic mould. He never allows us to forget that, as soon as we begin to explain anything, our limited minds tend to substitute what is easy to understand for the fulness of experience.

It is the more difficult to fit together von Hügel's ideas in a precise logical system in that he himself "hated to get things too clear." He had a sense of the immense richness of reality,

far beyond any human power of comprehension, and saw that you could get perfect logical lucidity only by confining your apprehension to a limited number of factors out of the whole. But von Hügel certainly held that to acquiesce in blurred outlines would have meant a poor kind of intellectual laziness. One of his favourite ideas of "fruitful tensions" meant that we should always be trying to get our ideas more lucid and precise, even if there would always be further fields of reality to make the edges dim. Thus in an opening chapter on von Hügel's epistemology a critic shews how he insisted that in getting knowledge of the Divine Reality the whole personality of man had to come into play, not the intellect only, and that in the best apprehension we can get there must still be "tension" and "twilight." His intimations of the supernatural were a begging of the question. "As he starts with God, he is naturally always able to find Him in the end." There may be some truth in this; yet probably no one ever believed in God by having God proved to him from neutral premisses: men are won to some view of the universe or other by meeting it set forth as a whole in certain human personalities—a complex of beliefs now operative, however those persons may have come by them.

To reduce the Baron's teaching to a system can never be satisfactory; his mind is rather like a river at its source, where many streams converge to the same bed. Instead, he was interested in any and every system, using them all as means to the light; the theory of experience, of development, the fascinating fallacy of the distinction between the truth of faith and the truth of history, all received from him a more than sympathetic hearing. Still none of them quite carried him away; with all his speculation von Hügel was essentially a realist, he liked to begin with facts and to end with something practical. For this very reason he clung to the objectivity of truth, the necessary connection between truth and goodness, between philosophy and morality, to the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. At times this craving for reality leads him into dangerous paths.

His was a mind that did not doubt, but sought its own explanations, and these, when probed, were found to be not always happily expressed. This is specially manifest in the Baron's whole analysis of mysticism; even the most devout admirer of von Hügel must often feel confused by his use of its terms, and the interpretation he often chooses to give them. It is not less apparent in his doctrines, or his speculations, concerning God; the Baron raises difficulties, as anyone must who attempts to define the Infinite, but not a few of his

difficulties, if he had realized it, had been forestalled by St. Thomas Aquinas seven centuries ago. Still, even to the Baron they were difficulties and never doubts; throughout his speculations there can be no doubt of the genuineness and resiliency of his faith.

The mind of von Hügel is like some great quarry from which successive builders draw their materials. This great, humble, spiritual man was the friend, wherever he found them, of seekers after God; and since his death his circle has gone on widening. Yet he was not, nor is, easy to know. Acquaintance with him is, at first, " costing," to use a favourite word of his own.

It was the function of von Hügel to be a teacher of teachers rather than a writer for the million. Simplicity of style was not among his many gifts. He had a habit of packing into one complex sentence thought after thought, together with balanced reflections and parenthetical observations, and this does not tend to easy reading. But the studious will agree that he always rewards those who study him; and there are considerable passages which are much simpler than some of his previous work. Von Hügel shews himself, in his letters as in his books, the most persuasive, because the most widely informed, the most restrained and the most candid champion of institutional religion that our age has seen, a great servant of humanity in its spiritual advance.

Few responsible thinkers today would deny that there is a respectable case for Theism, but the real difficulties are encountered when we try to think out the implications of belief in a personal creative God. It is the apparent antinomies which then arise which have led idealistic philosophers to attempt a further dialectical step beyond the God of religion to the super-personal Absolute.

The historical element in religion consists in " the tradition of the past of a religious community which is associated in the minds of its members with their sense of sharing in its life ": or, it is " the sense of a consciousness of personal continuity with an actual life reaching back into the past." The analogy of memory is useful in this connection: for, just as a man's memory may play him false, be lamentably defective at certain points or misrepresent matters or occurrences of serious moment, yet for all that it is the living thread, as it were, which connects all his experiences, accounts for their special meaning and tone for him, and gathers them into a unity which is none other than the present, living man himself; so the historical element in religion—tradition—the continuing sense of a living connection with certain past happenings, which binds the past to the

present and makes the latter vital and intelligible only through its consciously felt relation to the former, is a prime factor in the spiritual life which is of its very essence. This element—this tradition—this communal memory of a religious past may, and often does, exhibit the same features of variation, lapse, defectibility, and illusion as characterize an individual's memory of his own past: nevertheless, it too is continuous, it has its origins in concrete happenings in the past which have determined the direction of its future course, and there is no cataclysmic break in its historical chain; and if its general reliability and fidelity be impugned or denied, then the whole structure of the religion may be.

The term "religion" is often used of philosophies which contain no theistic belief. Our author finds that such use is not altogether to be denied. On the other hand, he finds that "God" is properly a religious term. It ought not to be used by philosophers when they only mean the ultimate reality, apart from any particular religious experience. He then proceeds to discuss those modes of thought which reject Theism, either because of the vastness of the universe and the seeming insignificance of man, or because of the spiritual greatness of man, or because they think that they can by the aid of psychology explain religion as an illusion.

No one can study von Hügel in any other light than in that of the supernatural. We may attempt to describe his philosophy; we shall find it a confusion, except it is a groping towards the higher light. We may, with still more profit, try to analyse his concept of human life; we shall find that, from first to last, it is dominated by the relation of man to God, and that not merely as creature to Creator, but also as a son, living in and by divine grace. We may draw out for ourselves his attitude to the moral order; we shall find that he holds, and holds with repeated emphasis, that "for its fullest development the ethical life implies faith in God."

The breadth and depth of his critical intelligence lift his survey above the plane of personal accident. He is not a specialist who, in the pursuit of his own researches, happens to have found God, but a profound thinker who, after full acquaintance with science, poetry, and secular philosophy, and thorough study of the conclusions towards which they point, has found the only possible explanation of the mysteries of the world and human life in Christian theism and faith in Jesus Christ, true God and true Man. The definite point on which he insists, and which determines his own standpoint, is that the evidence for the Christian religion is shewn not so much in the light it receives as in the light it gives. The

Christian philosophy indicates the only tenable clues to the maze of existence.

Very interesting is von Hügel's autobiographical account how, during the last nine years of Pope Leo XIII.'s life, he spent more than half the time in Rome when the question of Biblical criticism was beginning increasingly to occupy and alarm the authorities. Von Hügel says that he told Cardinal Rampolla, at that time Papal Secretary of State, that the position then held by the Roman Church in the field of Biblical criticism was a fortunate one; because it had laid the foundations of Pentateuchal criticism in the person of Richard Simon, who was one of its priests, and it had not so far committed itself to any solemn or final acts against it. "Would it not be well, even in precise and solemn theological condemnations of the results of specialist studies, science or scholarship, to rest satisfied with the condemnation of Heliocentrism and Galileo, as the share, in such acts, of the Roman Church? Why not leave to the Presbyterian Churches their share of such proceedings, in their solemn trials and condemnations of Pentateuchal criticism in the persons of my valiant friends, William Robertson Smith and Charles Augustus Briggs? If the situation were left thus, a pretty fair division of praise, if not of blame, would remain apportioned between the Roman Catholic and the most anti-Roman of the Christian Churches."

What Cardinal Rampolla thought of this advice von Hügel does not record. The apprehensions of conservative officialism were too much for such precautions. As von Hügel says: "A devotedly good but quite differently tempered bishop came to sit in St. Peter's chair." What followed was "a rapid succession of almost numberless condemnations and restrictions of every kind, and of almost every degree of solemnity and precision," with results which were evidently, to the writer's discernment, painful and unfortunate. But the irony of von Hügel's advice to the Cardinal Secretary of State in Rome is enhanced by the fact that the adviser related this story to the Presbyterians in Edinburgh.

"I happened first to learn to love, and to live in, the world of Caterinetta Fiesca Adorna, and was slowly brought, by such a love and life, to various questions made thus vivid for my own mind and practice." In these words Baron Friedrich von Hügel explains why he chose St. Catherine of Genoa rather than St. Teresa as the great example upon which to build as a rock his treatise on Mystical Religion. They occur early in his Preface to the last issue of his greatest and best-known work, *The Mystical Element of Religion, as Studied in St. Catherine of Genoa and her Friends.*

"And I have once again, as in the case of my 'Mystical Element,' to submit these my conclusions—conclusions which cannot fail to be at least imperfect in many ways and degrees—to my fellow-workers, and above all to the test and judgment of my fellow-Christians and of the Catholic Church." These are the concluding words of the preface in which Baron Friedrich von Hügel introduces his readers to his book, entitled *Eternal Life*—a book as thought-compelling and as learned as has appeared from the press for many a year. They disarm criticism almost in advance; for they declare the author's view that his study is a tentative, experimental essay, given forth in humility of heart, candour of soul, and submission of intellect. His learning is immense. His sketch of the past thought of the world, philosophic, Christian, mediæval, and modern, is short, succinct, and as clear as his difficult method of expression, truly an involved style, permits. The Baron is not easy to read. He is hard to read. And perhaps he may seem to some hard to understand. But once acquaintance has been made with his German-English convolution of clauses and interdependence of adjectives, his mode of conveying his mind grows easier for the determined reader. His sweep backward over religious systems and ideals is beyond question instructive and will repay perusal. No intellectual man will read it without interest and profit. His chapter on Socialism is one of the sanest and shrewdest criticisms on that much-debated theory that it has fallen to my fortune to meet.

"The Church was his spiritual home," says M. Nédoncelle, "to which he was bound by every fibre of his being, and which could not be compared with anything else. Yet his preference was for pre-Reformation Catholicism, more generous and less uneasy, he thought, than the Catholicism with which we are called on to live."

His books have now taken high place as classics in religious thought and practice. In cell and cloister, in school and study, he has come to be known and honoured by all who seek to learn the ways of God, and especially the Kingdom of God that is within us all. Many have come from reading his *magnum opus*, as the Baron himself did, "to learn to love, and live in, the world" of St. Catherine of Genoa. What a vast, varied, and many-coloured world it was and is! There we find a very universe of light and love and life eternal. It is as if the things invisible were to us made visible by means of the life and sufferings of this wonderful Saint, set out for us by this industrious scholar, and illuminated by the writer's genius for religion and the absorbing love of his chosen subject.

Catherine of Genoa was by no means a Saint only of the cell

and the cloister. She was married to a troublesome husband, but she got him to live with her in two little rooms inside the great hospital of the city where she tended the sick; later she acted as matron and had to fight the plague. This was between 1479 and 1496. Yet through all this very active work she was essentially a contemplative. Filled with a deep desire and devotion, she in 1474 became a daily communicant, and continued thus during her long life, although this practice was thought strange in those days. So we see that the story of this many-sided woman and Saint presents very varied aspects from which the mystical element in religion can be, and is here, practically considered.

So we might go through the whole gamut of what we include in the word "religion"; we shall find, as the author puts it in his own way, that "not merely his psychology but almost all his works suffer, as well as gain, from his predominantly personal and practical absorption in religious interests." And not only that, but his "religious interests" converge on one point: "All his training and experience convinced him that the ideal of Roman Catholic Christianity is the norm of what religion is and should be."

Von Hügel never swerved from this conclusion. "In Christianity he preferred Catholicism to Protestantism, because the former more deliberately acknowledges the supernatural life as essential to religion"; and "it disappointed him that Protestantism, although strongly developing the natural virtues of honesty, cleanliness, and a useful application of the mind, does not ordinarily rise above a moralistic piety, or attain much of that expansive joy required by the Roman Catholic Church for the canonization of its saints, even of those who, like St. Catherine of Genoa, are melancholy by nature." All this, and much more to the same effect, Dr. Harold Dakin acknowledges in his study of the Baron.

"In all his books, *The Mystical Element of Religion*, with its famous classification of all religion into the institutional, the mystical and the rational, *Eternal Life*, the First and Second Series of *Essays and Addresses*, his letters, his conversation, he was doing the same thing. He founded himself, not on an abstract system (he mistrusted all such things) but on a large experience, the Christianity by which Christians live. Thus he began his study of history at what Neville Figgis used to call the right end, which is today. His freedom was steadied by his unfaltering Catholicism. He might have taken for his motto the words, 'Thou shalt stablish me with Thy free spirit.' He would never agree to the dichotomy proposed by Auguste Sabatier when he spoke of the religions of authority

and the religion of the spirit. 'The individualist spirit,' he said, 'is incapable of making the truly life-giving sacrifice, that of taking its place permanently within a Church; it ignores the wholesome drama of tradition and the individual . . . there is in every offer, and in every acceptance, of one soul to another and by another, an element of noblest generosity and death, and this element is obviously recognized and fostered fully, not by the abstractive and purely spiritual religions, but by the concretionist, historical-institutional-incarnational Churches.' He did not mind provisional antinomies, and he welcomed historical criticism of the New Testament."

When we come to look back upon him as a whole, it is not his philosophy, not his temporary modernistic tendency, not his mistaken exegesis, which most draws us to the Baron. It is rather his loyal love of the Church to which he belonged, despite the human element which none recognized more than he; and, almost as a consequence of this, his setting of prayer above all philosophy, of the supernatural life above the natural, of God as Centre of all things, in time as well as in eternity.

With all his depth of faith von Hügel was no trained philosopher, and often, when he attempts to philosophize on what he believes, he exposes himself to many dangers. But these need not detain us here. Catholic scholars have long since learnt to distinguish the underlying strength of the Baron from his superficial weaknesses. In 1919 he was given the honorary degree of LL.D. of St. Andrews, and during the next year the D.D. of Oxford.

The Baron's philosophy is given in his books piecemeal. There were a number of ideas to which in his writing, or his more vivid spoken discourse, he recurred, a number of convictions to which he gave utterance, often impassioned, but he did not himself frame these ideas in any one systematic statement, building up his theory of the universe from its metaphysical foundations. He held it necessary to begin with life, with the organic, and therefore his philosophy began with immediate expression and in the light of this he treated all questions connected with the origin of the Church, and it is vital to the understanding of the Baron to grasp this. As an apologist von Hügel remains of greater use to those outside the Church and devoid of her guidance than to those already within the Fold.

C. WILLIAMSON.

LÉON OLLÉ-LAPRUNE (1839-1899)

THE name of Léon Ollé-Laprune is probably not a very familiar one to most English readers, although the distinguished teacher and writer who bore it died, at the height of his professional career, close on forty years ago. Great as the esteem was in which he was held by his fellow-countrymen, including many who in no way shared his beliefs, his reputation abroad seems to have been overshadowed by the more sensational fame of Taine and Renan. A convinced Catholic, he repeatedly attacked the popular scientific rationalism of his day; yet it is upon Catholic thought itself that his work has made the deepest impression.* Like Cardinal Newman, whom he greatly admired, he has been described as a Modernist of sorts, or, at least, as a precursor of Modernism, and in support of this view it might very plausibly be argued that his emphasis on the part of the will in achieving the full certitude of faith anticipated M. Edouard Le Roy's pragmatism, which the Church condemned.† But had he lived to see the actual *crise moderniste* and the publication of the encyclical *Pascendi* (1908) he would, we may be sure, have stoutly disclaimed any responsibility for doctrines that the Pope himself denounced as the essence of all heresies.

Born in 1839, Ollé-Laprune was educated at the École Normale Supérieure, where his youthful imagination was quickly kindled by the teaching of Caro. In 1875 he returned to the École Normale to assume the position on its staff which he occupied until his death. While still a student he determined to follow the example of Ozanam, a "Normalien" well-known alike for his fine scholarship and for his devotion to the Catholic Church, by attempting to do for Catholicism and philosophy what the latter had already done, in the academic world, for Catholicism and the science of history. In 1881 he had to face the opposition of an anti-clerical Government, and although he was suspended from his professorship by Jules Ferry his prestige as a teacher stood him in good stead, for he was reinstated a year later. The first to sign the protest addressed by his pupils to the minister on his behalf was the future Socialist deputy Jean Jaurès. His earliest publication of importance was a monograph on the philosophy of Malebranche (1870). A work of greater originality, however,

* Notably so, of course, in the case of M. Maurice Blondel's philosophy of Action.

† Voluntarism is no recent growth in French philosophical thought. It can trace its pedigree back to Maine de Biran, and ultimately to Descartes himself. *Cf.* L. S. Stebbing, *Pragmatism and French Voluntarism* (London, 1914).

and more characteristic of its author, was his doctorate thesis, a brilliant analysis of the nature of belief, which made its appearance in 1880 under the title *De la certitude morale.* This was followed almost at once by his *Essai sur la morale d'Aristote.* Then in 1890 came *La Philosophie et le temps présent,* in some respects his most notable literary achievement. In 1897 he was elected to membership of the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, in place of Vacherot. Meanwhile his repute as a leader of Catholic thought had been steadily growing; he was the centre of a wide circle of friends and acquaintances, and his advice was eagerly sought by students of all shades of opinion. Death, in 1899, cut short his work on a study of Jouffroy, but of his unpublished or uncollected papers there remained sufficient to provide material for two posthumous volumes, *La Vitalité chrétienne* and *La Raison et le Rationalisme.**

Ollé-Laprune combined to a remarkable extent the characters of the *savant* and the humble believer. Philosophy, he found, clarified and strengthened his faith, while faith, in its turn, became the inspiration and guide of his philosophy.† It seemed to him that the most urgent problem for both alike is that of human life itself, its purpose and ultimate meaning. The influence of Jouffroy, Caro and Gratry did much to deepen this conviction, but its source lay in his own instinctive "humanism," his sense of the profound significance of personality and its place in the scheme of things. The examination of abstract principles meant very little to him. Certain principles there are, he believed, which man, as a living, thinking being, cannot question, because they are themselves the very conditions of his life and thought. Moreover, the philosopher's real task is a moral one, and our modern preoccupation with epistemological "criticism"—the legacy of Kant—has broken the necessary contact of philosophy with life itself. No doubt there is a sense in which this point of view is open to the charge of anthropomorphism, but, after all, the value of man's personality, his intellectual and moral development, his status in creation, raise questions that are of fundamental importance, upon the answer to which will largely depend what we make of the universe as a whole. We may ask whether our author had properly understood the *Critique of Pure Reason.* Perhaps he had not. At all events its detached, coldly abstract method failed to lessen his conviction that a "humanistic" philosophy, for which the reality of things is an affirmation of man's whole nature—feeling, intelligence, will—is the only one that the

* Edited, respectively, by G. Goyau (1901) and V. Delbos (1907).

† "La philosophie est indissolublement affaire de raison et affaire d'âme."

metaphysician may profitably adopt. His own presuppositions were those of "common-sense," the necessary basis of any systematic thinking. He felt his work as a philosopher to be one of construction rather than of overthrow, construction upon the fullest possible data given us in actual experience. But he was frankly contemptuous of mere speculative philosophizing and system-making.

It is important to emphasize this "spiritual empiricism" (as we may call it) of Ollé-Laprune's, since it lies at the root of his whole outlook. Besides being the datum of our philosophy or dogma, experience, he taught, is a measure by which each element in the construction must be tested. That is why he could never dissociate his philosophical research from his life as a Christian believer. He did not doubt that his faith was the true and only adequate means of development for the natural resources of the personality. The meagre explanation of reality proffered us by rationalism he discovered to be worthless when brought into the light of our multiform experience. Its failure to bring the reason itself to a resting-place in the divine meant that it had no proper solution to the problem of our destiny.

Ollé-Laprune was opposed to fideism, however, no less than to rationalism. Though "moral certitude" is not the outcome of purely intellectual investigation it is much more than an individual intuition; it is a conviction of the whole personality —of heart, mind and will together. Faith and knowledge, he held, are interdependent, faith being an integral element in knowledge and knowledge an integral element in faith.* Knowledge is the grasp both of the appearance of things and of the principles which underlie them and constitute their real being.† Moral and spiritual truths, substance alike of knowledge and of faith, illuminate the understanding and direct the will to its appropriate action; the identification and acceptance of such truths is itself a moral act. These great moral and spiritual affirmations are, principally, the existence of God, the freedom of the will and personal immortality. In their light only can human character and destiny be understood; and herein lies the error of positivism, for the positivist, by denying them, would reduce mankind to the level of a mere by-product of mechanical forces.

The truth of these affirmations cannot, however, be decided on individual judgment alone, the fallibility of which experience daily proves, but on what Ollé-Laprune calls *le bon sens public.*‡ The *summum bonum* is the moral and spiritual life: *la destinée*

* As M. Blondel puts it, the life of the mind is always an organic part of the life of the creature (*Revue politique et littéraire*, 4me série, xiii., p. 217).

† *De la certitude morale*, p. 226 *f.*

‡ *Op. cit.*, p. 405.

de l'homme est non pas d'être savant mais d'être bon. Let us acquire, he says, all possible knowledge; let us add to the learning of the past the achievements of our own genius; let us, finally, become masters of the world of nature—but unless we do all within our power to live the moral life as well, we shall have missed our true goal.* We should, like Solomon, choose wisdom, provided it be the true wisdom, and not a counterfeit: *ayez tous les savoirs, le savoir-vivre et le savoir-faire, dans la bonne acceptation du mot, et puis le savoir proprement dit, le savoir pur, celui que nous nommons sagesse, σοφία.*†

What, then, are the features of this moral life? It is, essentially, activity, a process of accomplishment, our task in the world being the service of God and our fellow-men. In the second place it is a transformed life, a life raised, so to speak, to a higher power. Should we fail to realize it fully here on earth—and we know, in fact, that we cannot do so within the limits of this mortal existence—we have still the glorious hope of the life hereafter, when we shall no longer see as through a glass darkly.‡ Love is the power that moves us to moral action, and to live, in the best meaning of the word, is to love. That Good which is life perfect and eternal is the source of all life, its pattern, too, and end; supremely lovable, it is itself supremely loving; it *is* Love. The Good, Life, Love are one reality, identified, as St. John teaches us, in God. We are vitally related to God, and to all that proceeds from Him and returns again to Him; in giving ourselves to God in love we live, in a sense, the divine life itself.§

But although this belief is based upon the conviction that we have our very being in the life of God it is not to be confused with the pantheistic notion that we are ourselves divine, an idea which undoubtedly crept into much Modernist philosophy. Ollé-Laprune maintained unequivocally that we are separated from God by a wide gulf, and that we could never attain the divine by our own unaided strength. Just as moral certitude is ultimately the free gift of God, the fruit of divine grace, so, too, the best that life has to offer, communion with Him, can be achieved only by His prevenient help. Following orthodox Catholic teaching, Ollé-Laprune held that the fall of Adam deprived mankind of sanctifying grace and his original righteousness. As a race we succumbed to the temptation by which God tried us, and so have been reduced, in a sense, to a state of "nature." We might, of course, suppose this condition to be a merely negative one, a nudity, a lack of certain privileges, did we not know that God has created us for a high destiny.

* *Ibid.*, p. 348.
† *Essai sur la Morale d'Aristote*, p. 46.
‡ *Le Prix de la Vie* (Paris, 1894), p. 286.
§ *Op. cit.*, p. 325.

But we do know this. We know it by revelation. Thus are we forced to regard our state as one of spiritual privation, for the integrity of character which once belonged to us we now no longer possess; neither are we free from the perils of ignorance and craving desire; nor have we an inherent immortality. Our reason, although not destroyed, is clouded and darkened. We still enjoy a measure of free-will, but our volition is sadly weak. We are capable only of natural knowledge and natural virtues; anything more is utterly beyond our power.* Yet our humanity, frail as it is, in comparison with Godhead, has its own worth and dignity; for by our personal action we are able to become true causes and agents for good, even though such action springs ultimately from a source far superior to us.†

This teaching on original sin is, of course, clearly distinct from the Jansenist. Ollé-Laprune, for all his admiration of Pascal and the spirit of Port-Royal, considered that Jansenism, with its doctrine of total depravity, had " darkened religion with the shadow of a sombre and terrifying belief, a belief unknown to the early Fathers or the Schoolmen."‡ The genuinely Catholic doctrine, whilst being a more temperate one, is also more powerful. It is true that our reason and our will-power are inadequate, but they are not impotent. Human nature has lost its originally healthy character, its moral integrity, and in consequence has become enfeebled; yet it is not so thoroughly vitiated as to be incapable of any good even in the natural order of things. Grace does not entirely supplant nature; it reconditions nature and assists it on the road to its perfection.

It is here, Ollé-Laprune believed, that God's work of redemption, whatever its final significance may be, becomes most evident to us. By the liberating, re-creative grace of salvation which the Saviour has won for us we are restored to a state of grace; and this second state is more glorious than the first. The Incarnation of God in Man is the supreme miracle, for whereas by the sin of Adam we were lost, by Jesus Christ, by His suffering and death for us, we are saved. The solidarity of the human race, by which we share in Adam's guilt, enables us also to share in Christ's merits: *Et sicut Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur.* Christ is the new Adam and the true source of life.§

It may, of course, be objected that in saying this Ollé-Laprune is saying nothing new; that he is merely repeating the phrases of traditional Christian belief, without even the savour of a novel personal interpretation of a kind such as the Modernists

* *Ibid.*, pp. 352-354.
† *Ibid.*, p. 291.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 354 *f.*
§ *Ibid.*, pp. 355-358.

provided. But he would not himself have wished to be commemorated as an innovator, being content to teach the Catholic faith with humility. His originality lies much less in the formal content of his work than in its spirit and method. His doctrine was essentially orthodox, but the eager love of truth for its own sake, the unflinching *moralism*, the readiness to grapple with the problems of his age, which his life and teaching consistently shewed, mark him out among nineteenth-century Catholic writers as a man of unusual breadth and vigour of mind. To him Catholicism was much more than an inherited tradition; it was the means—the only means—whereby that universal need of man which religion, in its manifold forms, has attempted to meet can be satisfied. Balanced in his judgment, intense in his faith, an optimist in his sturdy proclamation of the Christian hope, he has a profound significance for us today. In the words of Blondel, who stood to him as disciple to master, " (il) mérite d'être consulté toujours comme l'un des meilleurs témoins de la pensée philosophique et chrétienne, autant qu'il est digne de devenir l'un des initiateurs des générations montantes."*

B. M. G. REARDON.

GRACE, VALIDITY, AND EFFICACY

THIS article owes its inception to the Report of the Archbishops' Commission on Doctrine in the Church of England. It is not a criticism of the Report as a whole, for in that Report is much that is of the highest value. Rather, it is a comment on one strain of thought, which from time to time appears in the pages of the Report, and which is evident in the sayings and writings of some Anglican divines. This point of view rightly maintains that God's will is for all men's salvation. It is asserted, perhaps a little loosely, that " Grace is one,"† and the conclusion reached is that " a rite, which is not a valid sacrament, may result in a reception of grace which is not distinguishable from that of which the sacrament is appointed to be the means."‡

Such a position is evidence of kindly feeling, but when actually worked out it results in this conclusion: man *can* receive all that he needs apart from valid sacraments, therefore the question of validity is really of little importance for man's spiritual health. It is quite unnecessary to be punctilious in this matter when discussing, for instance, the problem of

* *Léon Ollé-Laprune ; l'achèvement et l'avenir de son œuvre* (Paris, 1923), p. 279.
† Report, p. 52. ‡ Report, p. 131.

reunion. It is true that the matter of validity is sometimes declared to be important, or that validity is desirable, but no convincing reason for this importance or desirability is given. At any rate, it does not ultimately affect the question of efficacy, and that is what the average man really cares about. Perhaps this puts the view in an extreme form, but at times one feels justified in summarizing it in this manner.

Other people, with a wistful backward glance at orthodoxy, treat of validity as a matter of history. They speak of continuity and commission, but they end by saying that "God is not bound by His sacraments, though we are." This statement satisfies everybody. It gives the maker a comfortable feeling of being orthodox, and relieves others of all responsibility in the matter. One is inclined to doubt whether the statement applies to the case we are considering without qualification.

But there are some, nay, many, who feel in their hearts that the question of validity, with which is bound up that of Church order, is of supreme importance. It may be rather hard to put into words the grounds of this belief. Ideas of charity, and the repugnance against saying things which may be resented, may prevent these men from saying clearly what they believe. Whatever be the causes, their case is not made out well, and the impression given is that to stress validity is rather a "precious" attitude, and is somewhat remotely concerned with the facts of spiritual life. Therefore, unless we are to drift gently to the position that validity, and in consequence order, really do not matter, some clear and unequivocal statements are necessary.

1. First, let us deal with the meaning of the word "Grace." In the Report, Grace is defined as "the will of God regarded as active on behalf of and in man,"* and on this definition it is asserted that Grace itself is one.† It is said further that the distinctions (*e.g.*) between "prevenient," "co-operant" and "sacramental" Grace are distinctions only of mode.‡ The implication is that the only wholly satisfactory use of the word "Grace" is to describe the active will of God as above. But it is doubtful whether this theory takes account of all the factors involved. In the Twenty-ninth of the Thirty-nine Articles we find these words: "The wicked . . . although they do carnally and visibly press with their teeth the sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ, yet in no wise are they partakers with Christ." The language of this statement is not modern, but the truth which it contains, that, while the will of God is constant, the disposition of him who is the object of Grace affects the actual result, is generally accepted. Moreover, the Catechism speaks of "an outward and visible sign of an inward

* Report, p. 52. † *Ibid.* ‡ *Ibid.*

and spiritual *grace* given unto us," and throughout its teaching appears to combine the ideas of "specific gifts" of God and of the results in the spirit of man in its use of the word "Grace." The truth (of which the Catechism contains one example) is that in theological writing and speech from the New Testament onwards this word has been used with different meanings. These meanings must be determined from the contexts in which the word is used. And all the meanings are legitimate and satisfactory. In the case dealt with in Article XXIX., Grace (meaning the "will of God . . .") is present, but Grace (meaning an effective result) is absent. We realize that "the will of God regarded as active on behalf of and in man" does not exhaust the meaning of the word "Grace," but that the *result* of God's action in man must be taken into account. To define Grace as the Report does, to say that it is *one*, and then to speak of "grace which is not distinguishable from that of which the sacrament is appointed to be the means," is to introduce a confusion of ideas which detracts from truth. In summing up this stage of our argument, we may say that the word "Grace" has several rightful meanings, and, using a technical expression, that "efficacy" depends in part on the disposition of the recipient.

2. We come now to consider more fully the contention that "Grace itself is one."* This is true only if we describe by the word the will of God thought of in general terms. Above we noted in passing a use of the word in the Catechism whereby different gifts are denoted. It is quite clear that the Graces of Baptism and of Holy Communion are regarded as different. The act of Baptism does not convey the Grace of Holy Communion, nor Holy Communion that of Baptism. Grace, conceived of as the will of God, is one, but when we think of Grace as operating in men we must think of it as multiform; and the form it takes in the result depends on the needs of the recipient and on the circumstances in which it operates. The influence of a good Sunday-school teacher is a means of Grace. It does not give the same result as the sacrament of Baptism. So we may distinguish the Grace a son receives when rightly chastised by his father from that which a devout soul receives in Holy Communion. Thus the one Grace of God issues in different Graces, which are differentiated according to *circumstances*. We are using the word "Grace" with different meanings, but we know we are doing so, and are conscious of no misuse of language in doing it.

This stage of our argument is that according to circumstance God wills one benefit for one man and another for another, and

* Report, p. 52.

we become familiar with the fact that the will of God does not issue in an identical result whatever happens.

3. Now one circumstance which may or may not be present in a particular case is the circumstance of a valid sacrament. The word "valid" corresponds to *βέβαιος* in Greek and *validus* in Latin. *βέβαιος*, connected with *βαίνω*, contains the idea of being "on a sure footing," "warranted," or "authorized." *Validus*, connected with *valeo*, contains the idea of "power." As we inherit the theological thought of both Latin and Greek Christian writers, perhaps we may describe a valid sacrament as one whose power is warranted by God. In this respect the words of the Preface to the Ordinal are singularly reminiscent of the words of St. Ignatius, *ἐκείνη βεβαία εὐχαριστία ἡγείσθω, ἡ ὑπὸ τὸν ἐπίσκοπον οὖσα, ἢ ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς ἐπιτρέψῃ.** So the question arises, Does validity make a difference?

We may begin our probing of this problem by recalling an admirable conclusion to which the writers of the Report are led. "Our moral discipline depends in part upon the Laws of Nature not being continually modified for our special convenience."† This is admirable because it is true according to our observation and experience. In these ways of Nature we can observe and know the ways in which God works, and we realize that He does not change these ways to suit individual desires, or even needs.

Let us consider, as an example, three people present at a play in a theatre: a normal person, A; a blind man, B; and a deaf man, C. It is not B's fault that he is blind, nor C's that he is deaf. These are their misfortunes. None the less, each has a different appreciation of the performance. A's is normal, B's is such as comes from sound alone, C's such as comes from sight alone. In accordance with the principle enunciated above, God, the Author and Sustainer of Nature, does not override the defects of the media of appreciation for the convenience of B and C, though their defects are due to no fault of their own. In this instance a defective medium allows a measure of appreciation, but not the spiritual experience which comes from a complete appreciation. The results are different in the realm of fact.

In the sphere of Nature we are able to discern God's ways and the principles of His working with some measure of exactness. The same measure of exactness is not possible in the spiritual sphere. But two things can be asserted with certainty. (1) In both spheres the same God is dealing with the same human race. (2) The sacramental principle correlates the physical and the

* Ignatius, Ep. Smyrn. 8.

† Report, p. 48.

spiritual. It is therefore arguable that principles which are clear in the physical realm may be expected to operate in the spiritual realm. We might say of the latter that "our moral discipline depends in part upon principles not being continually modified for our special convenience." St. Paul in Rom. ii. 14 suggests that the Gentiles, though their religion is defective, have Grace. He does not suggest that it is all they could have. Rather his action, described in Acts xix. 1-6, indicates that those who have received Grace in measure through a defective medium should seek the better way when they can, and a greater gift of Grace.

These thoughts have a bearing on the conception of Validity. The Report says, rightly as we believe, that "a valid sacrament exists wherever the specially appointed conditions constituting the sacrament are duly and intentionally fulfilled."* It claims, too, that divine appointment may have been effected "in the action of the Apostolic Church taken under His (*i.e.*, our Lord's) authority and guided by His Spirit."† The Ordinal and Prayer Book shew what are the functions of ministers, and that episcopal ordination gives due authorization to these ministries. Now, if the conditions are not all fulfilled—*i.e.*, the medium is defective—then, according to our argument, while there may be *an* effect, we cannot assert that it is the full effect which the sacrament was ordained to give. All that we say (but we *do* say it) is that there is reason for coming to this conclusion. To assert, as the Report does, that "a rite, which is not a valid sacrament, may result in a reception of Grace which is not distinguishable from that of which the sacrament is appointed to be the means" is to suggest as true what cannot be proved, and what there is some reason to believe is untrue.

The third stage in our argument is that, while we recognize a Grace in all acts of genuine devotion, it is doubtful whether the whole purpose of God is effected when the "means of Grace" is defective. Not only the disposition of the recipient, but the validity of the means, needs to be taken into consideration. Whence it is concluded that those who discuss true validity, and who endeavour to shew what it is, are not arguing about trifles, but about something which concerns deeply the spiritual life of man.

P. C. Lempriere.

* Report, p. 131.

† *Ibid.*, p. 128.

THE BISHOPS, THE NATION, AND THE CHURCH

THE Editorial in September's issue of THEOLOGY, in its discussion of a pamphlet, makes it clear that a question may be asked, even though the author of the pamphlet may answer it somewhat too hastily. It is reasonable to ask what is the significance of certain tendencies that have recently been noticeable in the impact made by the Anglican Episcopate upon the life of the Church.

Probably at no time since the Reformation has the bench of Bishops been filled by such a painstaking, earnest, pleasant, and capable group of men. The Bishops are desperately anxious to serve their Church and country to the best of their ability. In spite of all their efforts, they must often feel a sense of frustration and if they are sensitive, as most men are, they must feel hurt by the somewhat obvious lack of appreciation given to them. They are trying so hard to be friendly, to establish contact with the man in the street—they are clearly irked by their palaces and gaiters; they are longing to be accepted by their people as men and not prelates—and yet, often it seems as one moves about in Church circles that nobody loves them. Individual Bishops are met with affection and trust in their own dioceses, but the bench as a whole does not stand well with the Church.

Perhaps at the moment the Episcopate as a body is viewed with a suspicion that is rather different in character from the light-hearted criticism that the Bishops have always had to face. The Church, as the Body of Christ, may be looked at as an organism. Each diocese then is the normal unit or cell organic to the life of the body as a whole. The Church ministers to the people of England in each diocese through the threefold ministry of Bishop, priest and deacon, who together with the faithful laity are the leaven within the life of the people in their own diocese or part of the country. The Bishop is the father of the flock in that portion of the vineyard—the order of Bishops emerges from, and is organic to, the life of the body as a whole. He is part of, and a fellow-worker with, the family. The Bishop is essentially the diocesan. He fathers and leads and serves the Church in his diocese. His fellowship is first and naturally with the presbyterate of the diocese, and then with the faithful laity, and his ministry through them is to the people in the diocese who are to be brought within the fellowship. The Bishops are often criticized for being outside their dioceses for one reason and another, and sometimes the

criticism is deserved, but for the most part they are resentful of the amount of time taken up by calls to London—that, however, is not the immediate point at issue. The suggestion is rather that the relationship of the Episcopate to the Church as a whole has slowly changed. The centre of gravity seems to have altered: it may be perhaps partly due to the Bishops being so much in London—yet the effect is the same whether they are much away from the diocese or not: namely, that the observer is conscious less of the Bishop in fellowship with the body of the Church in the diocese, and he does not seem in quite the same way as formerly to be organic to the normal life of the body or to emerge as the natural head of the family. The impression is given more of the Bishop in fellowship with his brother bishops, whereby is formed an order not so obviously organic to the life of the Church but rather superimposed upon it for its well-being and orderly governance, in accordance with the collective will of the Episcopate as a whole. The centre of gravity would seem rather to have moved from the life of the Church in each diocese to the Bishops' meetings in London. To some extent, then, they must move and think in an atmosphere that is continually charged with questions which concern the life of the nation as a whole—questions largely centring in the issues suggested by the words " Church and State "—all of these are, of course, vitally important questions—yet the result has been a tendency for the Bishops as a body to find themselves *vis à vis* the nation as a whole, instead of approaching their people through the Church, each in their own diocese. The appeal is made to the populace by means of pronouncements or exhortations over the head of the Church as a body. As a result, there are signs of a slight rift within the body of the Church, owing to the Episcopate tending away from normal Church life. The Bishops are most sincerely anxious that organized religion shall establish a more effective contact with the life of the man in the street, but, unfortunately, the nation as a whole, the " demos," gives little practical heed to the well-meant appeals of the official hierarchy. It is, therefore, very doubtful whether the attempted short-cut to reach the people is worth while, if it has the incidental effect of causing misgiving to the normal ministry of the Church and the effective " Laos " as a body.

The author of the pamphlet is quoted as saying of the Bishops: " They think of the English Church as National, and nothing more. To keep it that, they would sacrifice all else: their great principle is the ' Establishment.' "

Such a statement suggests that the Bishops are a collection of old-fashioned Erastians, and is not really a fair suggestion.

A reading of recent Episcopal Charges does, however, shew that the Bishops do set some considerable store by the Establishment. Their actions and policy give one the impression that they are conscious of serving a Church that is in fact established, and of ministering to a people or nation who are nominally members of the Church of England, while very many of them cannot be said in practice to belong to any Church at all. The Bishops are increasingly conscious of the fact that England is only nominally a Christian country; hence their very obvious anxiety to justify the *de facto* Establishment. It becomes of the first importance that the official Church shall make a noticeable impact upon the life of the nation at a central point. Most of the Bishops are genuinely convinced that the Establishment must be maintained—hence the many expedients and movements which attempt to " make a fair shew in the flesh."

Clearly, there is much to be said on both sides on the question of the Establishment. In this connection it may be relevant to mention the very significant and important book, *The Church and its Function in Society*, by W. A. Visser 't Hooft and J. H. Oldham. It is a book which would be of real value to every intelligent Churchman. It puts his Churchmanship in an œcumenical setting and provides an admirable corrective to the snare of parochialism. Having read it, one's mind is full of the vital importance of many world issues, and one goes back to the humdrum with an added sense of its significance. It is mentally invigorating to be in touch with affairs of State and in the world of affairs outside as a whole, but if one's normal environment tended to become national and œcumenical it would inevitably tend to a distortion in approaching everyday Church life. It is reasonable to suggest that a more effective impression could be made on the national life if there were a more natural fellowship of Bishop, priests and laity in each diocese, getting to grips with the situation as it is. The Bishops normally are friendly towards their clergy, yet as things are it must often be the bonhomie of a superior officer rather than the ministrations of a Father in God; whilst sometimes a Bishop must be sorely tempted when confronted by clerics, some of whom are fractious, some servile and some out to impress, to give them short shrift, while indulging in some good-fellowship with the churchwardens and sidesmen, who will be delighted with the homeliness of " our Bishop."

It seems to be clear that the Bishops as a body are in a very difficult situation. They are the official leaders of the Established Church, conscientiously attempting to make real the fiction that England may still reasonably be considered a Christian country. They therefore concentrate on commending

religion as such to the people. They are at all possible pains to make a success of the Church of England. Inevitably they must find themselves tempted, perhaps subconsciously, to give their semi-official patronage to various forms of popularized and liberalized religion. They must sometimes find that they have unawares encouraged some very small prophets with their quick returns, and have clutched at movements and expedients which have borne a very doubtful witness to the truth. Such movements are often rather self-conscious and gauche in their efforts to reach the people—they carry more than a suggestion of spiritual expediency, and their bustle and hectic over-confidence hint at the irrelevance of orthodoxy. The façade of so much of this kind of stimulated religious activity is painfully bourgeois, which is a very serious drawback before a world that is groping for reality.

The Bishops see clearly that it is essential that religion should be more readily accessible and more relevant to the needs of the man in the street, and they believe that the National Church is unique in having so many privileged points of approach. Yet the fact remains that the man in the street inevitably associates the Establishment with privilege in the bad sense of the word—with the State at a time when the word has an ominous sound—with the maintenance of the *status quo* at a time of general disintegration. As M. Maritain * says: "We are witnessing an event that we may call the Christian *Diaspora* . . . at a time when the Church having come through the crisis of the nineteenth century in which she had to fight for life and liberty, is in the act of resuming the leadership of the intellectual life of Christendom. This Christian consciousness is developing and is in our view likely to develop more and more a sense of hostility to capitalist materialism as well as to communist materialism, which is merely its consequence." Admittedly, such a statement is taking a long view and may over-simplify a little, but the gist of it must be disquieting in view of the fact that diocesan finance and the many special appeals depend for their success upon the subscriptions of the well-to-do landowners and business men in each diocese. Many of the Bishops are individually interested in social questions, sometimes obviously so—but the time has not yet come when they can express themselves collectively on their attitude towards the fabric of society as we find it today.

Meanwhile they are determined to put their own household in order—to bring order where chaos reigns within the Church. They feel acutely that a lack of liturgical uniformity is an effective scandal to the well-disposed men in the street. They

* *Freedom in the Modern World*, p. 126.

suggest that the laity are bewildered and alienated by the variety of services to be found within the general structure of the liturgy. Hence the Bishops as a body are determined to the utmost of their ability to secure a liturgical uniformity; in order to enforce their collective will upon the body of the Church they are busily engaged in arriving at a definition of lawful authority. The man in the street is not impressed; he dislikes over-centralization and does not bother really very much about liturgical questions. The clergy are full of resentment because they feel that the Episcopate is becoming aligned over against the Presbyterate. The author of the pamphlet quoted in THEOLOGY says that " Under the pretence that a new ' liturgical anarchy ' threatens the Church, they are going about to establish an ecclesiastical martial law by a pronunciamento." Obviously, uniformity is desirable, even though it is not an end in itself, but there does seem to be some justification for the author of the pamphlet when he says that the Bishops' campaign gives the impression of being directed against a *new* " liturgical anarchy." A great deal is written and said about " liturgical chaos " that does go beyond normal Episcopal moderation. This may be well-intentioned, but it is surely unfortunate. The Episcopal campaign seems to be ill-timed because it is thrust upon the body from above, just at the moment when the liturgical movement from within is gaining considerable momentum and is likely to give fresh life and direction to Catholicism within the Church. It should help the Church to achieve a measure of uniformity, while drawing its inspiration from the theology of the Church and the Christian way of life.

Neither the man in the street nor a fresh outburst of liturgical chaos can be found to offer a sufficient *casus belli*. Hence it is sometimes assumed that the Bishops' main object is to effect a fresh regimentation of the Catholic Movement as a whole. The reason given for their attitude would be that they are genuinely alarmed by various hysterical reports of Anglo-Papist excesses. It is possible however that the Bishops may feel that the present moment is opportune for dealing in some way with the Catholic movement, and for another reason, which perhaps at present is in their minds, yet barely formulated. They are genuinely grateful for the Anglican Revival, as they said in 1933—they are glad to have things done decently and in order, and to have a measure of Catholicism reabsorbed into the life of the Church as a whole. They are also grateful for the intellectual achievements of the liberal Catholic scholars, from Bishop Gore onwards. Equally, on the other hand, they are relieved that militant Protestantism and old-fashioned

Evangelicalism have almost died out in England, or at all events in the South of England, except in a few extreme outposts such as Bath and Tunbridge Wells. They see a possibility at last that the Church of England might present a united popular front to the nation—a moderate liberal high-Church religion—if only the extremes could be lopped off at each end. With the scandal of chaos removed, the man in the street would flock back to the Church of England. Probably the Bishops are disappointed with Anglo-Catholicism. It is not a popular movement. The heroes of the Catholic revival in the slums of Victorian England wrought such marvels by the Grace of God, that the movement came to be romanticized in a sense very different from the æsthetic. Then in the days of Frank Weston and the great Anglo-Catholic Congresses it was again the most vital movement within the Church, and as such must have affected the attitude of the Bishops towards it. But with the growing secularism of the nation its impact became less obvious and the liberal Evangelical movement seemed to be a far more potent force for the attraction of the man in the street. Some priests became discouraged, and rather through a sense of frustration gave some very slight foundation to the legend that Anglo-Catholics sit in a biretta in church waiting for the people to come to them instead of going out and evangelizing their parishes. Hence, perhaps, the tendency on the part of some Bishops to think of Catholicism mainly in terms of High Churchery—of ceremonial and of " things " you put on in church; and from such a point of view it is almost impossible to grasp the ethos of Catholicism as a philosophy of life—as a presentation of the essential truths about God and man. Throughout the last fifty years Catholics have held the field in the realm of theological scholarship and Christian sociology and the rout of the liberals is almost complete. Yet the liberals are encouraged in all kinds of liturgical experiments that can sometimes be described as chaotic, while the Catholic is denounced for leading the people in ordered devotion before the Holy Sacrament, where the thought and prayers of the people are focused at a point in reality.

The Bishops are, perhaps, in some cases handicapped by the fact that their idiom and outlook is that of a former generation, yet for the most part they are men of real ability and obvious integrity, and since they have exceptional opportunities for seeing the signs of the times, they are very seriously alarmed about the Church of England as she is. Sometimes they seem to be almost desperate as they see fissures appearing in the structure of her system, and when they are tempted to feel cynical about their available personnel. It is perhaps at such

times that they launch out into attempts to save the Church of England by means of religious propaganda which is aimed at the people over the head of the Church. Episcopal activity is so well intentioned, but it is reasonable to ask whether a good deal of energy is fruitlessly dissipated. The man in the street is not impressed and the Church is critical. It may be that the Divine Purpose does not at this point in time will that the Church of England should be a popular success at all. Such a statement may be made soberly without any suggestion of defeatism, and without implying any desire that the Church should close in on itself into the sanctuary and away from the world. It does suggest rather a concentration of forces—a fellowship in each part of the Church of the threefold ministry bound together in a common purpose of profound significance. The Church would not strive after worldly success with a strident propaganda, but in the light of the Cross would realize that numbers are not everything and that a spirit of self-sacrifice is more important. If the Church as a whole could see the immense significance of itself as a leaven, even if it be a minority or a remnant, it would lose that pathetic sense of frustration which compels it to waste so much energy in " making a fair shew in the flesh " before the world. Christians should be taught how they can penetrate intelligently and with the right touch into all sorts of places, so that there is a Christian cell at work here, there and everywhere—it is far better to aim at being the sap of the nation's life than to be a mere surface froth. The sap is hidden, yet, of course, the Christian must be ready openly to defend his faith at any time.

To close the ranks is often but an empty catch-phrase, yet it may be relevant here if the Episcopate were to be more obviously Fathers in God in their dioceses, it would almost certainly follow that the presbyterate would take new heart and be more effective Fathers of their flocks in their parishes. In the last sixty years those Bishops who are best remembered by the man in the street have been without exception first and foremost men of God—saintly men of prayer, and secondly, perhaps, able administrators and organizers.

AN ASSISTANT PRIEST.*

* This article was originally signed, but, by the advice of the Editor, it has become anonymous in order to abstain from even the appearance of personal criticism.—ED.

MISCELLANEA

A NEGLECTED ASPECT OF THE MINISTRY OF ABSOLUTION

"Therefore, if there be any of you who by this means cannot quiet his own conscience herein, but requireth further comfort or counsel, let him come to me, or to some other discreet and learned minister of God's word, and open his grief; that by the ministry of God's holy word he may receive the benefit of absolution, to the quieting of his conscience, and avoiding of all scruple and doubtfulness."

THIS passage from the Communion Service is constantly appealed to as authoritative for Anglican teaching and practice regarding sacramental confession. Observe, then, that it is to a minister of God's word that the penitent is bidden to come, and that it is by the ministry of God's word that he is to receive absolution. What is the significance of this? Some Low Churchmen who look with a cold eye on sacramental confession, and yet do not wish to ignore this injunction of the Prayer Book, argue that it means that absolution consists in the reading of the Bible with the penitent and the exposition of it to him. Such an interpretation of absolution is not, however, in harmony with the form of absolution given in the service for the Visitation of the Sick or with the commission which each priest receives at his ordination. Nevertheless the passage quoted strongly suggests that in the ministry of absolution Holy Scripture should count for a good deal more than it commonly does. The ministry of God's holy word ought to mean more than the prescription of a few psalms to be recited as penance. When the recitation of psalms or other passages of Scripture is enjoined as penance it would not be out of place for the confessor to point out their relevance to the condition of the penitent. If this were done there would be less of the casual handing out of "stock prescriptions," a practice to be avoided by the physician of the soul no less than by the physician of the body.

It is, however, in the giving of spiritual counsel and advice that the greatest use of the Bible can be made. For example, a penitent making his first confession is apt to be discouraged by the feeling that what is costing him a considerable moral effort is being received by his confessor without a trace of emotion, as indeed it should be, though the implication of unconcern which the penitent reads into it is not justified. He may also be disappointed because he does not find an immediate and obvious solution of nearly all his difficulties and problems in the counsel which he receives. If the confessor suspects that his penitent is in this frame of mind—and it is a far from uncommon one—he may find it a good plan to refer him to the story of Naaman. In the present decadent state of Bible-reading he may indeed have to be prepared to tell the story. A more direct use of the Bible can be made with the scrupulous penitent, who has to be assured that penitence rather than self-criticism is the purpose of self-examination, by pointing him to the Pauline "I judge not mine own self,"* or to the Johannine "God is greater than our heart."† Many other such applications of the Scriptures will suggest themselves.

This is an aspect of the ministry of absolution that manuals for confessors appear to have overlooked. Some of them even go the length

* 1 Cor. iv. 3. † John iii. 20.

of warning against preaching to penitents, instancing some confessors who give their Sunday sermon a kind of trial trip in the confessional during the previous week. But nothing like this is here being urged. It is generally recognized that the prayer-life of his penitents is the confessor's legitimate concern. He will therefore be giving them valuable help in meditation if he can shew them how to apply the teaching of Holy Scripture to their own particular needs. As has been hinted in the previous paragraph, this use of the Bible in the confessional may be rather laborious owing to the ignorance of the Scriptures now prevalent; but that only makes it the more necessary, and the time and trouble will be well spent if the penitent can be put in touch with so sure a guide to the way of holiness.

The above considerations cannot be expected to make a strong appeal to those who refuse to countenance a distinctively Anglican practice with regard to confession and absolution. If, on the other hand, the legitimacy of not a few important differences between Anglicanism and Tridentine Catholicism be recognized, it will be seen that this method of spiritual direction is wholly consonant with the constant appeal of the Anglican Reformers to Holy Scripture in every department of faith and practice.

Two important conclusions suggest themselves:

1. That the ministry of absolution is an essential part of the ministry of the word.

2. That deep familiarity with Holy Scripture ranks with, if indeed it does not take precedence of, knowledge of moral theology and psychological training in the equipment of a confessor.

J. S. Macarthur.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY

Mr. Ashley Sampson's article on the Resurrection of the Body in the September Theology was a necessary reminder that a difficult problem is being shirked, and he deserves our thanks for not only raising the question but really facing it. The matter is one about which many people are concerned, and our failure to give a reasoned and definite statement is doing us great harm. Mr. Sampson's instinctive feeling that the doctrine is correct is, I am sure, perfectly well founded. But I venture to suggest that we shall have to carry our questionings farther back than he does, and try to answer the question, What is the Body? He is evidently aware that there is a question, as he refers, for example, to the fact that most of the materials included in the body are changed every seven years. But this is only a sort of noticeable index of a constant change. Extrusion of used-up matter and inclusion of fresh matter goes on incessantly. At every breath we part with some materials and acquire others in their place. Each day the material taken in at meal-time replaces its equivalent, which is removed as waste matter. One is therefore driven to the conclusion that the body, which preserves its individuality throughout, does not consist of the particular bits of matter which it includes at any given moment. This consideration is reinforced by the reflection that to fix the matter in the body would be to kill it. Its very continuance depends on its being able to get rid of substances and absorb others. Prevent its breathing, or choke the

pores of the skin so that they cannot perform their part in exuding what ought to be got rid of, and death will swiftly ensue. Unless the body changes its materials it cannot persist.

What is it, then, which persists? Go back to the additions and rejections which are regularly made. These are all incorporations into or extrusions from a system. And note that this is not like the substitution of a new part for an old in a machine. The material which is taken in is modified by the system, and borne by the system into the place where it is to play its part. And that system is a closed system, interlocked so completely as to form an absolute unity. Material may come, material may go, material may be moved from point to point. But the system remains. Why?

In order to get further back, the system may be analyzed in two ways. It may be considered as a system of vitality. There is a specific life which avails itself of these materials. It has been said, of course, that the life is the product of the materials. But the materials do not put themselves into the combinations necessary to carry life on. It is the life which so arranges them. After death, in many cases, all the materials are still there for some time. But they do not produce life. Since, then, the life is superior to the materials, in the sense of being master of them, since it underlies them so as to produce and maintain the pattern, it might well be conjectured that it could survive their loss and be transferred to some other sphere.

But since vitality is, at present, an enigma to us, let us take a second way of analyzing the system. It is—or, at all events, there is—a system of forces, cohesive, capillary, chemical, electrical, and so on. From this point of view, then, the body may be regarded as a complex of forces which persists despite all changes in the material which it holds at a particular moment. It is a field of force, closed and self-subsistent.

The idea of a field of force and of complexes of force is familiar enough to scientists. But, as it has scarcely reached the general public, let me try to illustrate what is meant. Perhaps an experience of my own may help. One summer day as I was walking on a road in Yorkshire, I noticed a small whirlwind coming across the fields. Its presence and passage were shewn by the sudden rising of bits of waste stuff into the air. Presently it crossed the dusty road, in front of me, at an angle, so that it went along the road for a few yards. During this time, because of the dust which it lifted, the columnar shape was filled out, and completely defined. But when it had left the road this disappeared, and again I could only trace it by chance effects. But it was obviously still there, though the dust which had appeared to constitute it had gone.

Most schoolboys, I imagine, know something of the field of force which surrounds a magnet. If you place a piece of paper on a magnet, sprinkle iron filings over it, and tap the paper, the filings are drawn into a regular pattern of lines around the magnet. If you leave them behind, take the magnet to some other place and repeat the experiment with a fresh lot of filings, precisely the same lines will be formed. There is a systematic and unchanging arrangement of forces around the magnet, which, given its opportunity, will always arrange suitable materials in the same way.

The atom, as is widely realized, is a closed system of forces, a permanent complex of forces, apparently in a violent state of motion, but yet retaining the same pattern for an illimitable period.

Now, whatever vitality may be, and whatever its relation to what are called "physical forces," the human body appears to be a closed system of forces. It keeps its own shape, so to speak. In disease the system is disturbed, and at death it appears to break up. But does it, necessarily? The materials cease to be under its control, but may that not mean that in getting out of control they have escaped from the system, or even that the system has shaken itself free of them?

In any case a system of force is not "material" in the ordinary sense. And men have had to abandon the idea that force is simply a convenient term for the effect of one bit of matter pushing against another. Force is real, in its own right. And it underlies matter and controls it. Of course we must be on our guard against lumping together all which underlies matter, and calling it all spirit. But force would appear to be one step in the journey from matter to spirit. And the vitality with which force is associated in the human body is certainly another and probably far longer step.

It seems, therefore, that there is really no difficulty in conceiving that the complex of forces which is the real body, or, at least, the vitality or whatever it be which sets that complex up, can survive the loss of the chemicals which it holds together on this earth. But, at the same time, we have no means of knowing what those forces or that vitality would have to act on. That, however, scarcely concerns us.

There is one point in Mr. Sampson's paper against which I must protest. He says: "Matter cannot, by the very nature of its composition, perish: and it is strange that an age which above all things boasts of its scientific outlook should so easily acquiesce in a doctrine of resurrection that implicitly denies a basic principle of science." But is it a basic principle of science? It used to be a conclusion drawn from chemistry. Matter is not destroyed in any chemical change that we know. But since the atom has passed into the hands of the physicist, other facts have appeared. Surely the breakdown of the radium atom is a destruction. Indeed, a short time ago, when it seemed as though matter was a mere phenomenon of electricity, it was quite easy to envisage the total disappearance of matter. It is not so at present. But the speculations as to the formation of new matter in some part of the universe point the same way. And it seems certain that the mass of the sun, for example, is being dissipated in radiated energy. We may possibly have to extend the use of the term "matter" to all manner of rays. But what is styled matter at present has no guarantee of permanence whatever, and I cannot but regret that Mr. Sampson has assumed the opposite in his careful and useful study of the subject of the resurrection of the body.

R. O. P. Taylor.

AS WE FORGIVE

Every time we use the pattern prayer to ask for God's forgiveness we accept for ourselves the condition upon which its bestowal depends, but enquiry shews that a vast proportion of our people have little idea why such a condition should be demanded.

Those who think about the matter at all seriously realize how urgently our Lord taught the preliminary need for forgiveness of others' faults if we would win His pardon for ourselves; they see how frequently the

teaching recurs in parable and instruction; but they are at a loss to understand why it should be so.

On the lowest plane amongst attempted explanations, admittedly held by only a small minority, is found the idea that it is merely an arbitrary caprice on the part of God, that the all-loving Father is capable of behaving like a petulant child who will "take his bat home" if the game is not played according to his rules.

Though the majority would not welcome the strict application to themselves of the principle of Bedonebyasyoudid, yet they are perhaps willing to see that there is an intelligible justice in the clause, that of Doasyouwouldbedoneby, but even to these it is either a sort of bargain made with God, or still a more or less arbitrary condition, and few can see that it is a principle of such far-reaching importance that it binds God as well as man.

For it ultimately rests on the nature of God, the nature of sin, and the meaning of forgiveness.

It is essential that people should realize more and more that sin is not primarily an action or a series of actions, but rather that these are the outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual resistance to Grace which precedes them. Sin, that is to say, is of the will, and each yielding to temptation affects the character that a man is, and therefore we can speak of a barrier between the soul and God; it is the barrier interposed by man's own wilfulness.

God's forgiveness implies the breaking down of this wall of partition, but this cannot happen apart from man's repentance. It means the restoration of man to his condition apart from sin, God's treatment of him thenceforward as though he had not sinned; but owing to the nature of the Godhead, this cannot be as long as man's will is set against Him. Even when man turns to God it requires the Sacrifice of Calvary to restore him, but not even Christ's death can save him against his will.

How does this affect the condition in the Lord's Prayer? Simply in this way.

God is love: if a man is at one with God, he too, as far as human nature will allow, is love; he reflects the love of God in all his being. But if a man is in a state of unfriendliness towards his neighbour, if he is for any reason unwilling to forgive his neighbour's injury to himself, he is to that extent a denial of love. Of course, it may happen that because of his neighbour's impenitence he is prevented from putting his forgiveness into effect, yet it must be there in his heart ready to flow forth as soon as the channel is open to receive it.

Otherwise he is not in a state of charity, he is still interposing the barrier of his own will against the free flowing of the love of God, and consequently the forgiveness of God cannot reach him.

So the repetition of the clause becomes for us not only the acceptance, in order to gain freedom for ourselves, of a condition of more or less doubtful reasonableness externally imposed by a dictatorial will, but even in itself a prayer that, living with our wills so attuned to God in perfect charity, we may be the channels to men of His divine forgiveness.

H. R. Wilson.

THOUGHTS ON THE CRISIS

The Greek word "crisis" originally meant a "separating." Whenever a startling event occurs, stirring the minds of a multitude, they may be divided very roughly into two groups: those who think rightly about it and those who think wrongly. There may be a third group, those who do not think about it at all; but in the present instance their number is very small and may be ignored.

What has happened? A few weeks ago we were living our ordinary lives, which had become more and more engrossed in all manner of social services, when we suddenly found ourselves on the very brink of an unspeakable horror, but in a day or two we learnt dramatically beyond all parallel that we were saved. Since then there has been a tumultuous outburst of gratitude to our gallant Prime Minister which after about half a week was blended with a raucous note of disapproval, then of abuse culminating in a journalistic masterpiece that Neville Chamberlain had behaved like Judas Iscariot!

Since the event the thoughts or anyhow the talk of the majority have been concerned with matters of urgent but in reality of subordinate importance, such as the psychology of Hitler, the need of rearmament, the fate of Czechoslovakia and so forth. But anyone who is trying to live on the religion of the New Testament and believes that we are in this world to be trained for Eternal Life cannot help interpreting this and every other startling event as a reminder from our Creator that the claims of Eternity have again been put behind those of Time.

To find a warrant for this assertion we must remind ourselves of some unpalatable facts dating from before 1914. Serious-minded people spoke of the War as a warning given to our nation to save us from the dangers of increasing wealth, schism between classes, and civil war. We made a titanic effort of self-sacrifice and united action and did—so we thought—more than anyone to save Europe from a nightmare.

So as soon as we had rested from the struggle we gave ourselves with unheard-of energy to combating the evils of our social life: the slaves, unemployment, economic unrest and others. But we forgot that what we were striving for was to fulfil the last five commandments while more and more ignoring the first five. Many excuses might be urged for the line we took, but no one has attempted to shew that it was in accordance with the teaching of Jesus Christ.

Many passages from that teaching might be quoted; but one of surpassing cogency and universal significance will suffice. On one occasion Jesus was asked, "Which is the first and greatest commandment?" In modern parlance the question would be something of this sort: "We, the chosen people of God, after long centuries of special training and unique experience, find ourselves encompassed about with terrible dangers and acute perplexities arising from divergencies of opinion among our leading men. We feel that we as a nation are on the wrong road. Can You guide us back into the right one?" The answer, which we all know by heart, may be thus paraphrased: "You are in this world for one supreme purpose: to return the revealed Love of your Creator with a love which means the surrender of your whole being to Him, as to a Personal and Ever-Present Reality, and increasing joy in the doing of His Will."

There can be no doubt that these words mean, namely, that the purpose

of our creation is that we should grow in the grace of loving God; and that the conditions of fulfilling that purpose consist in (*a*) speaking with God (prayer and worship) and (*b*) in stedfast obedience to His plainest commandments. Anyone who can persuade himself that as a community we have fulfilled these conditions must infer that what we have experienced and are experiencing is not a warning at all, because there is nothing for us to be warned against except perhaps inadequacy of home defence.

As to (*a*), it is generally admitted that since 1870 the number of children reared in prayerless homes and totally ignorant of the Gospel has never been so large as it is now. As to (*b*), take only the three leading commands about prayer, fasting, and almsgiving, disobedience to which has been more marked since the War than before. But even more staggering has been the undermining of the principles of sexual morality. It is now known that many young men and women have been influenced by able writers and actually encourage the vices mentioned by St. Paul in Rom. i. *sub finem;* further, that some of these votaries of the New Morality are seeking teaching-posts in Secondary and Elementary Schools.

How is it that when these facts are brought before the public they are received with a shrug of the shoulders? It is because the immense crusade for the bettering of the world has taken the place of worship, men having forgotten that we are to seek the Kingdom of God *first*, or not at all. Many have railed on the Church for using an obscure expression. In doing so they have railed on Christ. He often spoke of the Kingdom of the Heavens without explaining further—probably because we could not understand. We are nevertheless to seek: to *ask, confident that we shall receive.* We must not let our efforts for bettering the world deprive us of time for prayer.

The most appalling fact with which we are confronted is this: Just as we are learning the surpassing tenderness, combined with tremendous severity, of Christ's words about children we find that Hitlerism means the murder of countless innocent souls of little ones by bringing them up in an atmosphere of idolatry. State worship crowned with temporal success is a dazzling brazen image of power irresistible by human endeavour.

Yet we are called upon to sing: "Be joyful in the Lord, all ye lands." The reason is that in giving our country the special commission to fight the enemy in his stronghold—a task of infinite difficulty—God reveals the ineffable mystery of His forgiveness of ourselves to whom much has been given. We can pray for Hitler, his advisers, for the German children and our own; and the better we pray for others the better we pray for ourselves.

EDWARD LYTTELTON.

THE CHILDREN OF WISDOM

ST. LUKE vii. 35 records our Lord as summing up the verdict on His contemporaries' treatment of Himself and St. John the Baptist in the words "And (yet) Wisdom has (always) been judged (by men) righteous (*i.e.*, faithful to her promises) because of (the character of) her representatives, one and all."

St. Matthew xi. 19 has the same comment on the irresponsiveness of "this generation," but for "children" has "works." Critics and commentators have focused their attention on this variation, finding reason to see in it evidence for an Aramaic original. Less consideration

seems to have been given to the precise meaning of the words when regarded in the light of the requirements of the logical nexus of the whole passage.

As a starting-point for the determination of this we may assume that the entire passage has come from the common source here used by both evangelists. This source plainly had records of sayings of our Lord about St. John the Baptist's qualities and significance, but, read continuously as they are found in the First Gospel, they present a difficulty through the apparent discrepancy between the picture first given of a more than prophet waited upon and accepted by multitudes, and the later criticism of this generation for its unreadiness to respond either to the Baptist or to the Son of Man.

St. Luke, it can be seen, felt this discrepancy and rightly supplied an editorial interposition, making it clear that in the second part of the discourse " this generation " was a sweeping phrase (*cf.* Matt. xii. 39) for the religious leaders of the day and their followers. The generality took the new prophetic message to be an instance of the Divine faithfulness to the promises given before. A universal egalitarian religion not confined to a favoured nation or favoured class was seen to be a better thing developing out of the earlier national religion of privilege. The Pharisees disregarded and defeated the Divine purpose of a further and higher stage in the religious education of humanity. Neither John's appeal to them nor our Lord's found an echo in their hearts. With this explanation given, St. Luke goes on to the saying about the irresponsive children. To end this with the remark that the Divine wisdom is nevertheless recognized by all who are " called " must seem to lack point. The true sense must be that the Divine wisdom is to be recognized and has always been recognized in the choice and character of its representatives or agents, not one only nor even one or two, but in all. After facing the requirements of the context we must point to the position of " all " at the end of the sentence, which demands the interpretation just given. For the " because of " we may compare Luke xix. 3.

And for " righteousness," for God's faithfulness to His promises, fulfilling the hopes He has inspired, *cf.* Psalm lxxxiv. 11. It may be added that the verb here almost comes to mean " is justified by its success " in the modern English sense. As to " children " it has been said that in " Jewish phrase " children of wisdom is best translated, wise men. That " children " is here used in preference to " sons " may perhaps be explained as due to a desire to avoid coupling St. John with our Lord as if both were in the same sense " sons " of God. Still St. Luke translated closely and thought of the representatives or agents of the Divine wisdom; St. Matthew, interpreting as usual more freely, speaks of their activities as operations or actions or workings of the Divine wisdom.

T. Nicklin.

CORRESPONDENCE

" LITURGICAL UNIFORMITY *versus* UNITY OF BELIEF "

Sir,

You are rightly accounted a shrewd judge of a document's *actualité*; and yet you have commented on my penny pamphlet on much the same scale as on *Doctrine in the Church of England*. Was this quite

fair to the eminent Commissioners? Nevertheless, for all your careful study—though I rarely saw so many misconceptions—I seem to have failed to make the point clear to you, and consequently to your readers. May I try again, quite simply this time?

The Archbishop of York, in his Foreword to the *Report* (p. 12), writes: "I wholeheartedly accept as historical fact . . . the Resurrection of (our Lord's) physical body from death and the tomb. . . . But I fully recognize the position of those who sincerely affirm the reality of our Lord's Incarnation without accepting . . . this event as an actual historical occurrence." In other words, orthodox belief in this article of the Creed is now optional for Anglicans in His Grace's view. Yet *Article* IV. says plainly: "Christ did truly rise again from death, and took again his body, with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature." . .

I submit that here is a change in something more important than the position of the Prayer of Oblation. It may be a necessary change, even a salutary one; but still it *is* a change. And having regard to the cardinal part played in the New Testament by this particular doctrine, I call it a "revolutionary change" for bishops now, of their own motion, to begin to treat it as *ἀδιάφορον* for Anglicanism. And having regard to the surreptitious way in which that change is being effected, I will adopt your word (not mine) and call it "sinister."

But you, Sir, do not like this clear-cut issue; and you have insinuated that the Episcopate do not mean by this any revolution. For my part I believe that both their intelligence and their acquaintance with Anglican formularies must be rated higher than that. But you may be right. In any case we shall all know what to think by January, when they will have before them a petition from 8,000 clergy praying them to declare, "That the Church of England holds and teaches the Nicene Creed in that sense only in which it has ever been held throughout the history of the Church, and that her ministers cannot rightly claim a liberty to set aside by private interpretation the historic meaning of those clauses which state the events of the earthly life of our Lord Jesus Christ."

If they grant that, you will be justified in your opinion. They will hardly refuse; but if they should hedge—*Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes*?—they will have disqualified themselves, even more completely than they have done already, to haggle about the provisions of the "Act for the Uniformity of *Religion*"—a title which goes deeper than rubrics.

I am, Sir, your servant *in Domino*,
THE AUTHOR OF THE PAMPHLET.

WHAT IS MAN?

SIR,

I now learn from Miss Bird, with whom the Editor has kindly put me in touch, that she did not intend to attribute to me the words which I found so dissimilar to any I had used or should be likely to have used: but only to indicate her belief that the thoughts she was expressing in her own language were in agreement with those which she had found

in my books. I entirely accept this explanation, but I venture to think that most readers would have taken the references in the footnotes to imply that the sentences were in substance quotations from my writings.

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

OLD RECTORY,
PITCHCOTT,
NR. AYLESBURY.
October 22, 1938.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Ephemerides Theologicæ Lovanienses. February, 1938.

The first article in this number is by one of the editors, Fr. J. Coppens, and is concerned with a proposal to make a new translation of the Psalter for Breviary use. The various inconveniences of the present unrevised Latin Psalter are pointed out, its literalism and its mistakes. It would not, in the author's opinion, be any remedy to print a new version side by side with the old, for who could read two columns at once ? A more drastic procedure is called for if the Psalms are to be recited with understanding. Fr. Coppens sketches what such a revised version ought to be, and gives examples of several proposed re-translations, adding in an appendix to the main body of the article a proposed revision of the Psalms for Sext on Wednesdays. This is of considerable interest in itself.

The next article, by Fr. Callewaert, discusses the origins of the Christian Sunday with its eucharistic celebration. Its germs are found not so much in any Pauline churches of the dispersion as in the original arrangements of the Church at Jerusalem, where there was " breaking of bread on the First Day of the week." Its first purpose and its whole idea are eucharistic.

A very interesting note follows upon the *supernomen* as found in the Acts. The *supernomen* or *signum* has nothing to do with the Roman *cognomen* but traces its origin from Egypt, and thence appears in Syria and other parts of the hellenized world. It was applied for a variety of reasons—a " war name " for soldiers, a sobriquet for members of a club or companions in games, and so on. Sometimes it was just an assonance with a name of barbarian origin. A few instances occurring in Acts are examined, such as Joseph Barsabas, also called Justus, Simon Niger, Tabitha Dorcas and others. The passage in Acts xiii. 8, " Bar-jesus Elymas," presents some difficulties—we must understand " interpreted " in a rather wide sense.

Another note, of interest to Anglicans, deals with " exterior " and " interior " intention; R.C. theologians commonly require some interior intention as well as a mere intention of doing *quod facit Ecclesia.* Several dogmatic statements, the Armenian Decree of Eugenius IV., Martin V. and the Wickliffites and the Council of Trent are examined from this point of view. No very clear definition, however, seems to emerge.

The rest of the number is occupied with reviews and notices.

W. R. V. BRADE.

REVIEWS

War and the Christian. By Charles E. Raven, D.D. S.C.M. Press. 5s.

Peace and Pacifism. By Humphry Beevor. The Centenary Press. 5s.

These two volumes should be taken together. They are an instructive example of different standpoints from which a subject may be approached. They supplement each other alike in their contrasts and their agreements. Their theme is urgent and momentous. It cannot fail to attract attention. It calls for as much space as may be granted to a reviewer.

An important feature of Dr. Raven's book is that it is the work of a convinced Pacifist who was not of that way of thinking in 1914, nor for at least fifteen years afterwards. He has therefore personally experienced both attitudes towards war. He excels in extremely graphic and forcible pictures of the horrors and abominations of modern warfare as contrasted with former methods of strife. The sword is "the gentleman's weapon." The true symbol of recent war is "a squat and loathsome howitzer, sniffing with blind and lascivious muzzle for its human victim, a thing more obscene than the Minotaur." The author is convinced that war is for the Christian a flat denial of his faith. The attitude of the Churches is deplorable. The Roman and the Anglican officially recognize the right of the Christian to bear arms and serve in war. And this until recently has been almost the universal opinion of all denominations, except the Society of Friends. If there is now a minority on the other side, it is, Dr. Raven thinks, smallest in the Established Churches of England and Scotland—partly from their connection with the State, partly from their generally greater regard for tradition. The New Testament teaching is briefly summarized in four pages. The Master refused to defend Himself or to allow His followers to defend Him. Yet Dr. Raven acknowledges that it does not therefore follow that we shall best shew our discipleship by a literal imitation of His way. Are we Christlike enough to do what He did? It may be our true wisdom to realize that armed force is still a necessary instrument for His service. Should war be regarded as the less of two evils? The argument that to kill in battle may be for us, and in the last resort, the only way to escape a betrayal of our trust wins at the present time a measure of

response. Men urge that recent rearmament is a tragic proof that Pacifism is as yet hopelessly impracticable. They say that the world is not yet ready for peace, and that if those who desire to work for peace disarm prematurely they will merely sacrifice all hope of attaining it.

The force of these arguments is appreciated. Against it Dr. Raven sets his reasons for renunciation of war. He insists that the strength of the Pacifist case is that it gives full value in this matter to the revelation in Christ, and stands for an uncompromising discipleship. He considers that those who regard war as a necessary evil waver in their allegiance between the Spirit and the works of the flesh. " My duty as a Christian citizen to arrest a burglar or to protect a lonely woman from rape has no sort of bearing upon my duty to smash up the homes and torture the families of men who are no more guilty than I am of any offence against morals or religion." If asked, Do you seriously mean that you would sit still and see your country invaded ? his answer is that " this is the logical outcome of his views, that he believes it to be a far more fruitful course than war, and that in fact he does not believe that a thoroughgoing Pacifism would have this result." But of course " the Pacifist, however strong his grounds for hope, must face the possibility that at first his non-resistance will invite successful aggression, and thus might expose his family and fellow-countrymen to invasion and carnage." To this he can only say that passionately as he cares for friends and country he cannot protect his own home by smashing the homes of others.

But he admits that the Pacifist minority is divided. Many among them maintain that total disarmament would involve so momentous a risk as to be impracticable, or at least unwise, and therefore not manifestly Christian.

Dr. Raven has very little hope that the Churches will promote a dispassionate inquiry into Pacifism. Prejudices are too strong, official pronouncements too indefinite. If they did discuss and reconsider, the result would not go beyond a statement of antagonistic positions, an agreement to differ. He thinks that " a Pacifist schism, whether voluntary or forced, would convince the mass of thinking folk that, as they already suspect, the Churches are inextricably committed to the support of the present economic and political order, and are still at heart flunkeys to the powers that be, who trim their pulpits to the breeze that blows from Whitehall."

Mr. Humphry Beevor's book fully recognizes that the case for a thoroughgoing adherence to the principle of non-resistance, as being the only course which our Lord's teaching

and example will sanction, is at first sight an extremely impressive one. But he maintains that the absolute Pacifist claim to find in the Sermon on the Mount the unhesitating affirmative of that principle is only an example of reasoning from proof-texts. Of course he agrees that our Lord nowhere positively advocates the use of force in any circumstances; but he insists that our Lord's teaching contains no word which condemns the use of force when inspired by the desire to defend the oppressed, and not by personal malice against the oppressor. It is acknowledged that in our Lord's example the absolute Pacifist has at first sight a strong case in defence of his principles, but stress is laid on the fact that our Lord did in one incident employ physical force. The author agrees with St. Thomas that good men do not bear with evil men to the extent of tolerating the injuries they inflict on God and on their neighbour. Mr. Beevor contends that much modern Pacifist thought is based on the utterly false theory that the use of violence is intrinsically wrong in all circumstances whatever. There are certain occasions when it is a duty to use force. "The traditional theology of the Church affirms that there can be such a thing as a just war, though the conditions that make it just are a great deal more stringent than is generally realized."

If Pacifism is rejected as a doctrine, ought it not to be accepted as a practical policy? Among the influences for promoting peace the author considers that neither the League of Nations, which has lost its prestige, nor the Vatican pronouncement, which has no effect in Russia and limited effect in various other regions, can afford us much security. Accordingly the author is led to consider the claim that the only possible policy for the preservation of peace is a refusal on the part of individuals to participate in hostilities for any cause whatever. His reflection is that if the next war begins with an air-raid which works one-tenth of the havoc and destruction which the experts predict, there will be no need to convert the vast mass of the population to a desire for peace at any price.

He affirms that the weakness of the Pacifist movement lies in its absence of a dogmatic foundation.

Returning to our Lord's example. There was one occasion on which our Lord Himself refused to use force: that occasion was the climax of His earthly life. And we cannot arrive at the true Christian attitude towards peace without considering the Passion of our Lord. The passage about the two swords is interpreted as ironical, and pronounced entirely inapplicable to Pacifism, since our Lord was not contending against the armed forces of Caiaphas and Pilate, but against the powers of

darkness "against whom the only weapon is complete self-surrender." Yet it is recognized that we cannot say that the battle with evil, in which our Lord was engaged, was such that His followers cannot be called to share: for the Christian is called to a very real share in the work of Redemption. Here then, the author admits, "it begins to look as if our conclusion must take the form of absolute Pacifism which we have repudiated." But here a distinction has to be made. "A Christian may use force in the defence of the oppressed: a Christian may use force to restrain the stubborn and evil doers: but a Christian is bound to testify to the ultimate futility of the use of force when the evil to be combated lies wholly outside the sphere of human moral responsibility. And this is the case with modern war." It is intolerable that it should be thought right for Christians to acquiesce in the wholesale slaughter of Christian by Christian which war entails. A Christian must constantly protest against the adoption of a policy of reprisal. On the other hand, there remains the Christian duty of protecting the defenceless, if necessary by violent means. But "there is an overwhelming probability that the Christian will find himself in the ranks of the conscientious objectors in any future war."

Mr. Beevor agrees in substance with Dr. Raven on the uselessness of expecting clear, uncompromising guidance on the subject from the authorities of the English Church. Both writers have their distinctive contribution to make towards a problem beset with difficulties. Their similarities are as impressive as their differences.

W. J. Sparrow Simpson.

NOTICES

John James Wettstein. By C. L. Hulbert-Powell. London, S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

Shortly after the Great War, the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge issued a pamphlet proposing the issue of a new and revised edition of Wettstein's *Greek Testament*, first published in 1751-2 by Dommeers at Amsterdam. At the same time the same project was mooted in Germany, by Professor Adolf Deissmann, and the preliminary work began at the Religionsgeschichtliches Forschungsinstitut at Leipzig. In 1921 the material collected by the British scholars was made available for the German revisers, and it is hoped that the new German edition will presently be published. It may be seen therefore that there is particular suitability in Canon Hulbert-Powell's undertaking, in compiling for the English public an account of the man and his work. Wettstein's *Greek Testament* presents to the reader a text which departs but rarely from the

Textus Receptus and Prolegomena and an *apparatus criticus* which, while having lost most of their practical value, retain much of interest. It presents also a "commentary" printed beneath the critical notes, and this it is which justifies the projected re-edition. To a very small extent does it consist of the author's explanations or comments. Rather it may be described as being the contents of a vast figurative card-index of illustrative material from the classics, the Fathers, rabbinic writers, and general literature, gleaned from a well-nigh incredible field of personal reading on Wettstein's part. Such a collection and ordering of the matter in relation to the sacred text has perennial value, especially as it forms a foundation upon which further material can be built. Those who make much use of Wettstein's *Greek Testament* must feel the need, as Canon Hulbert-Powell did, of some insight into the mind behind the "commentary." And this book, the fruit of much labour (there is a formidable array of literature in the making of it, much of it in Dutch) meets that need.

From it one can learn the strange mixture of acuteness and unreliability of judgment that characterized Wettstein's outlook, both on his studies and on life in general. There are questions of great interest to which no answer is provided. For the wonder of the sixteenth to seventeenth century *eruditi* is not their power as thinkers, still less the fineness of their feeling. It is their insatiable avidity for learning, and their dauntlessness in undertaking superhuman labours. One would like to know more of the inner history of the acquisition of that mass of knowledge, which is the real ground of Wettstein's greatness. How, for example, did he, by the way, become a master of Syriac? It would be, again, most interesting to know more of his contacts with Roman Catholic scholars and ecclesiastics, and of the manner of that humanism which characterized his life outside the study and the rostrum.

But there is very much in the picture which Canon Hulbert-Powell draws to stir a reader's interest. If the picture of church life at Bâle is unattractive, that of the Remonstrant community at Amsterdam is the reverse.

Stylistically the book suffers a little from the continual effort to condense the contents of source-documents, and it sometimes results in sentences of obscure meaning. But from beginning to end it is sound and careful work, for which we can be grateful. The Bishop of Truro writes a foreword.

W. Telfer.

With Jesus in Palestine. By A. J. Macdonald, D.D. Skeffington. 3s. 6d.

Time was when the reading of sermons was almost popular; but the climate of thought, or feeling, has changed. There are not many preachers today whose sermons deserve to be perpetuated in volume form, for men of the calibre of J. B. Mozley, John Caird, R. W. Church, are few—"rari nantes in gurgite vasto." But the Rector of St. Dunstan's has contrived to give us a collection of short but vigorous addresses which are genuinely worth reading; they arrest attention and stimulate thought. Sometimes they are provocative—no great demerit. Among such sermons we may instance the following: Third Party Faith, the Law of Worship, and (above all, perhaps) The Anger of Christ. This last is a fine thing;

it is certainly a prophylactic against false sentiment. Another good address is on the Religion of Youth, where the preacher, emphasising the fact that Jesus was Himself a young man, writes thus: "No one else in history ever revealed more effectively the alert vigour of the youthful intellect than Jesus." This book is, we think, one to read—and keep.

E. H. Blakeney.

The Church of the Apostles and Fathers. By the Rev. F. E. Barker. S.P.C.K. 4s.

In his foreword Prof. Hodgson says that Mr. Barker has done "a piece of work which may well be an inspiration and example for parochial clergy." We agree. Once it becomes known, we believe this little volume will be wisely used in study circles, for it contains a quantity of carefully sifted information not easily obtainable elsewhere in so brief a compass. Matters both of historical and doctrinal importance are clearly set forth, and the results of recent inquiry and research are duly tabulated. Obviously, in a short notice like the present, it is not possible to do more than to indicate the scope of the book. It is divided into four main parts: Part I., which is concerned with the primitive Church and its ministry, is subdivided into five sections; Part II., consisting of three sections, contains an account of Christian worship in its gradual development; in Part III. ("Faith and Love") we have five helpful chapters on rules of faith, the way of life, the monastic ideal, etc.; Part IV., with which the volume ends, has a single chapter on historical movements from Pentecost to the Great Schism.

E. H. Blakeney.

The Last Chapters of Enoch in Greek. Edited by Campbell Bonner with the collaboration of Herbert C. Youtie. Pp. x+106+2 Plates. Christophers. 15s.

The Book of Enoch is a curious and instructive example of a type of literature which, though it must always have made an appeal to many minds, nevertheless failed on the whole to secure the protection of inclusion among canonical scriptures. The appeal would secure for such works a certain vogue at any rate for a time: the non-inclusion would diminish the chance of permanent preservation. In the case of Enoch the results have been queerly diversified and Professor Bonner's present publication is the latest development of a remarkable story. The ten chapters now edited from papyrus leaves, partly at Michigan and partly in the Chester Beatty collection on this side the Atlantic, make an important addition to our knowledge of the Greek text with quite interesting critical and palæographical problems and a useful means of checking the Ethiopic version. In the editor's view the manuscript "probably never contained more of the Book of Enoch than the concluding section (Chapter 91 to the end, without 105 and 108)"; and though such a judgment necessarily depends in some measure upon other considerations than literary construction, yet even if chapters 91-95 (5) now missing at the beginning could be supplied the result would be a literary fragment of an extraordinary kind, as anyone may see who will attempt a reconstruction of what he supposes that it may have looked like. Professor Bonner has printed the Greek

text of the papyri as it stands with a restored version facing it at each opening and detailed notes at the foot of each page together with a translation and an index of Greek words at the end. The scope for conjectural emendation is wide in some cases, but not unreasonably so; and the book is a very pleasant one to live with.

CLAUDE JENKINS.

A HUNDRED YEARS OF BRITISH PHILOSOPHY. By Rudolf Metz. George Allen and Unwin. 25s.

This translation of a 1935 German work is a valuable addition to the Library of Philosophy edited by Dr. J. H. Muirhead. In relation to individual philosophers Dr. Metz first examines the Utilitarian-Empirical and the Evolutionary-Naturalist schools of philosophy. Part II. deals mainly with the Neo-Idealist Movement, Pragmatism and the Old and New Realism. This section contains a brilliant essay (pp. 556-589) on Bertrand Russell, whose books, translated into German, outnumber those of all British philosophers. The philosophy of Natural Science provides excellent monographs of Oliver Lodge, A. S. Eddington, J. S. Haldane and J. C. Smuts. The last chapter deals with theism and the philosophy of religion, and, though A. J. Balfour, W. R. Inge and B. H. Streeter are included, surely, in spite of what is said on p. 778, F. R. Tennant and W. R. Matthews should have been added? It would also have enriched the book if some mention had been made of the Bishop of Birmingham's Gifford Lectures. The book concludes with a section on Neo-Scholasticism which scarcely does justice to the Thomistic writers of the Roman Church in England and Ireland, and one wonders if the last sentence in the book about Dr. A. E. Taylor's contribution to philosophy is one with which he would altogether agree. But these are all minor points; the work is an ideal reference book for all philosophical students and should be very useful for those who have to take certain examinations after the minimum of studious preparation.

PATRICK COWLEY.

THE GOLDEN BOOK OF EASTERN SAINTS. By Donald Attwater. Coldwell, London. 9s. 6d.

Mr. Attwater is well known by his books on *The Catholic Eastern Churches* and *The Dissident Eastern Churches* as a learned and charitable Roman Catholic authority on Eastern Christendom. In particular he is concerned to maintain that union with Rome involves neither latinization of rite nor a western stereotyping of spirituality. The present work, which is intended as a companion to the other two, illustrates this thesis by practical examples. It consists of seventeen sketches of Eastern saints who died in communion with Rome, either before ths Schism or as members of Uniate bodies. It begins with St. Basil and ends with the twentieth century, and not the least of its interest is due to the fact that most of the saints with whom it deals are practically unknown to Western Christians. It is a fascinating example of good religious biography, and the pictures which accompany it are admirably chosen. But it is a pity that a book of less than two hundred pages could not be produced at a lower price.

E. L. MASCALL.

THE SALVATION OF MODERN MAN. By W. G. Peck. The Centenary Press. 5s.

The argument of Dr. Peck's book is that the Church in modern days —that is, one supposes, since the Reformation—has abandoned the claim that religion must govern the whole of life and restricted itself to the inculcation of an inward pietism. Its notion of salvation has come to be a personal and not a social one. This Dr. Peck rightly maintains to be inadequate; and there will be wide agreement with his plea that the Faith properly understood is " the way of salvation for man in the organic wholeness of his being." Much of the devotional language and hymnody of the Church breathes of the cloister rather than of the world, and not a few sincere men have cast religion aside because it seems to be indifferent to the main stream of life and to concentrate attention upon inward problems. People who feel the pinch of the modern social situation are apt to look elsewhere than to religion for a clue to the means of betterment. Dr. Peck expresses his feelings on the matter in words of passionate conviction, and in the main his protest is a legitimate one which needs to be uttered in every age. What we should question is the assumption that the evil is a specifically post-Reformation product. Travel and invention have since the Reformation changed the face of human life, it is true; but was there in mediæval times any genuine reference of social problems to the Christian law ? Society then had a static character, and Christian justice as envisaged and expounded by the Church went no farther than to keep each man in his proper station and to curb, where it was possible, the worst excesses of the powerful. Neither then, nor at any other period of history, Christian or otherwise, would the immense claims now being made for the well-being of the common man have been listened to for a moment. Such problems as those of brotherhood, equality and peace were estimated against a fixed background of established custom which no man was free to question, far less to alter. The change from the mediæval to the modern world has been one from the static to the dynamic. Few will contend that the official Church has played a satisfactory part in meeting the new conditions. But then, has the Church ever done so ? Or, since it is composed of sinful men, is it ever likely to do so perfectly ? Dr. Peck bids us " rediscover " the total meaning of our religion. This is going too far. Our prophets are justified in bidding us discover what the faith implies, but the term " rediscover " assumes what is not true.

It is because Dr. Peck starts from the antithesis of mediæval and modern that he will allow nothing good to the modern world. For the " capitalistic system " no words are bad enough. It produces goods solely for the sake of financial interests. It is incapable of any amelioration—only fit to be swept away. Between it and a Christian system there must be war to the death. To bring a Christian spirit into capitalism would not improve it, but only cause an explosion. Dr. Peck speaks scornfully of a " comfortable congregation of the *rentier*, county and bank-directing orders singing

> His blood-red banner streams afar,
> Who follows in His train?

Yet there is often a strain of heroism to be discovered in unlikely places; and it must be remembered that we do not sing hymns as propositions in logic, but as incentives to action which we recognize to be ideal,

even when we lack the courage or wisdom to pursue it to the end. And in any case, what is the use of words whose effect, if not their intention, must be to stir up bitter feeling and to poison the air as between man and man? Nor is the extravagant condemnation of capitalism a fair one. The system will no doubt be superseded one day by something better; but meanwhile it serves millions of people, giving them in ever greater profusion clothes, means of travel, opportunities of knowledge and many luxuries undreamed of only a few generations ago. This note of service is a genuine one, and it ought not to be entirely disregarded.

G. W. Butterworth.

The English Recusants. A study of the Post-Reformation Catholic Survival and the Operation of the Recusancy Laws. By Brian Magee. With an Introduction by Hilaire Belloc. Pp. xxx+230. Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 10s. 6d.

The reader of this volume may learn from Mr. Belloc what he would scarcely have inferred from historical research, that the Marian persecution "cruel though it was and unprecedented in scale, was a national protest against foreign interference—foreign interference of the oddities introduced by Cranmer (Swiss, German, French and other Reformers); interference of the Spaniard and his chaplains who tried to prevent the persecution altogether and to protect the heretics." By Mr. Magee he will be introduced more profitably to a new effort to determine the proportion borne to the rest of the population, especially in the later part of the sixteenth and in the seventeenth century, by those who retained their allegiance to Rome. It was an attempt well worth making and he has brought together a large amount of useful information in regard to which his work deserves thanks, even if it is with a wistful regret for the many gaps and a wish that the evidence might be amplified by further publication. And it should be remembered that an under-estimate is more impressive than an improvement of figures. Few will doubt that when Thomas Ogle writes of Northumberland Recusants in 1625 "their number by conviction was 900, their number by estimation 2,000" the probability is *not* what Mr. Magee says—viz., that he "meant that there were 2,000 reputed Recusants in Northumberland, in addition to the 900 convicted" any more than because in Elizabeth's reign the burthen of the *Triumphe* is given as "1000, esteemed otherwise 1,300 Tonnes" the "contemporary connotation" of "estimation" would justify us in making the vessel 2,300 tons. Mr. Magee rightly rejects Cardinal Gasquet's statement in *Hampshire Recusants* about Recusant property (accompanied by an even more ludicrous multiplication by twelve), both due to lack of familiarity with procedure and social conditions; but he will probably find reason, if he can find leisure to go on collecting information, to recast some of his own arguments based on social conditions. How far his results will be confirmed it may be too early to prophesy. Some will be less like the round figures of which he says that they "are only very approximate," when he means, one may suppose, "a rough estimate," and there are others to be found in Elizabethan exchequer returns which might be used controversially in opposition. But an enquiry of this kind is not a proper subject for controversy, and there are enough materials available for a team of research students if they could only be persuaded

to endure the drudgery of collecting the facts. In regard to the seventeenth century the balance of probability seems to the reviewer to be on the side of the argument which Mr. Magee favours, but unfortunately less often to be on the side of the interpretation which he places on particular pieces of evidence.

CLAUDE JENKINS.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRAYER BOOK. By C. S. Phillips, D.D. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

This is just the kind of book to put into the hands not only of solitary students (who do not happen to be specialists), but into the hands of those who meet in study circles. It is not only learned but interesting; the "tone" throughout leaves nothing to be desired; and this is worth noting, as, in dealing with subjects that have been and still are controversial, it is difficult sometimes to avoid airing prejudices, or to refrain from language likely to annoy other people. We may—in fact do—venture, here and there, to differ from the author (who is, by the way, Chaplain of the College of St. Nicolas, Chislehurst) on certain of his conclusions; but, as he is careful to supply us with the data on which those conclusions are based, there is nothing to regret.

E. H. BLAKENEY.

THE GOSPEL OF JESUS CHRIST. By Père M.-J. Lagrange, O.P. Volume I. Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 10s. 6d.

Père M.-J. Lagrange wrote massive commentaries on the Gospels, distinguished for wide learning and first-hand knowledge of the Holy Land. He also wrote a Synopsis, which has been translated into English as *A Catholic Harmony of the Gospels* (Burns Oates and Washbourne). In this he followed the Lucan order, and chiefly the Johannine chronology. The present book is the first volume of a two-volume translation of a commentary on the Synopsis. The translation was undertaken by the late Fr. Luke Walker, O.P., a pupil of Fr. Lagrange, and was completed by Fr. R. Ginns, O.P. It is so well done, that one would hardly realize on taking it up that it was not originally written in English.

The book has been for years a handbook for seminarists, and the author expresses a hope that its simple style may commend it even to "manual workers." Its calm objective account of our Lord's acts and teaching provides an insight into the attitude of the Roman Church to the Bible, which is profoundly interesting.

W. J. FERRAR.

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